Which colleges are top Division 3 lacrosse recruits choosing for 2023. How does the recruitment process work for Division 3 lacrosse. What factors influence Division 3 lacrosse commitments. Where are the best Division 3 lacrosse programs located.
Overview of Division 3 Lacrosse Commitments for 2023
The landscape of Division 3 lacrosse commitments for the 2023 season showcases a diverse array of talented athletes choosing to continue their academic and athletic careers at various institutions across the United States. This comprehensive guide delves into the commitments made by high school lacrosse players to NCAA Division 3 programs, highlighting the schools, players, and trends shaping the future of collegiate lacrosse.
Notable Division 3 Lacrosse Programs Attracting Top Recruits
Several Division 3 institutions have emerged as popular destinations for lacrosse recruits in 2023. Some of the standout programs include:
- University of Lynchburg
- Elizabethtown College
- Arcadia University
- DeSales University
- Widener University
These schools have consistently attracted talented players, often due to their strong academic programs, competitive lacrosse teams, and supportive athletic environments.
Why are these programs appealing to recruits?
Division 3 programs offer a unique balance of academic rigor and athletic competition. Many recruits are drawn to these institutions for their ability to provide a well-rounded college experience, allowing students to excel both on the field and in the classroom. Additionally, the smaller campus sizes and close-knit communities often associated with Division 3 schools can be particularly appealing to student-athletes seeking a more personalized college experience.
Geographic Distribution of Division 3 Lacrosse Commitments
The 2023 Division 3 lacrosse commitments reveal a wide geographic spread of talent across the United States. While traditionally strong lacrosse regions like the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic continue to produce a high number of recruits, there is a noticeable increase in commitments from other areas of the country.
Which regions are emerging as lacrosse hotbeds?
Regions such as the Midwest, South, and West Coast are seeing a rise in lacrosse participation and, consequently, an increase in Division 3 commitments. This geographical diversification is contributing to the growth and evolution of the sport at the collegiate level.
Factors Influencing Division 3 Lacrosse Commitments
Several key factors play a role in a recruit’s decision to commit to a Division 3 lacrosse program:
- Academic opportunities
- Coaching staff and team culture
- Campus location and facilities
- Playing time prospects
- Financial aid packages
Understanding these factors can provide valuable insights into the decision-making process of student-athletes and help both players and programs make informed choices.
How do academic considerations impact Division 3 commitments?
For many Division 3 recruits, academic opportunities are a primary consideration. Unlike Division 1 and 2 programs, Division 3 schools do not offer athletic scholarships, placing a greater emphasis on academic achievements and financial aid packages. This often leads to a more holistic evaluation of a school’s offerings, with recruits carefully weighing both athletic and academic factors in their decision-making process.
Recruitment Process for Division 3 Lacrosse
The recruitment process for Division 3 lacrosse differs in several ways from that of Division 1 and 2 programs. Key aspects of the Division 3 recruitment process include:
- Earlier communication between coaches and prospects
- Greater emphasis on academic qualifications
- More flexibility in the timing of commitments
- Increased importance of campus visits and overnight stays
When does the Division 3 lacrosse recruitment process typically begin?
The recruitment process for Division 3 lacrosse often begins earlier than for other divisions, with some coaches initiating contact with prospective student-athletes as early as their sophomore year of high school. This extended timeline allows for a more comprehensive evaluation of both athletic ability and academic fit, ensuring that recruits find the best possible match for their college careers.
Impact of Division 3 Commitments on High School Lacrosse Programs
The success of high school lacrosse players in securing Division 3 commitments can have a significant impact on their respective programs. Some of the effects include:
- Increased visibility for the high school team
- Motivation for younger players to pursue collegiate opportunities
- Enhanced reputation of the high school’s lacrosse program
- Stronger relationships between high school and college coaches
These factors can create a positive feedback loop, potentially leading to more opportunities for future players from the same high school programs.
How do Division 3 commitments benefit high school lacrosse programs?
When players from a high school program commit to play at the collegiate level, it often elevates the profile of the entire team. This increased visibility can attract more talented players to the program, improve fundraising efforts, and create a culture of success that permeates throughout the team. Additionally, the connections formed between high school and college coaches can lead to more recruitment opportunities for future players.
Trends in Division 3 Lacrosse Commitments for 2023
Analysis of the 2023 Division 3 lacrosse commitments reveals several interesting trends:
- Increased diversity in recruit backgrounds and playing styles
- Growing emphasis on multi-sport athletes
- Rise in commitments to newly established programs
- Greater focus on academic achievements alongside athletic prowess
These trends reflect the evolving landscape of Division 3 lacrosse and the changing priorities of both recruits and college programs.
Why is there a growing emphasis on multi-sport athletes in Division 3 lacrosse recruitment?
Division 3 programs are increasingly recognizing the value of multi-sport athletes in lacrosse. These players often bring a diverse skill set, enhanced athleticism, and a well-rounded approach to competition. The transferable skills and mental toughness developed through participation in multiple sports can translate well to the lacrosse field, making these athletes particularly attractive to college coaches.
Future Outlook for Division 3 Lacrosse
The current trends in Division 3 lacrosse commitments provide insights into the future direction of the sport at this level. Some projections for the future of Division 3 lacrosse include:
- Continued growth in the number of Division 3 lacrosse programs
- Increased competition for top recruits among Division 3 schools
- Further geographic expansion of the sport
- Enhanced integration of technology in recruitment and player development
These developments are likely to shape the landscape of Division 3 lacrosse in the coming years, influencing both the recruitment process and the overall competitiveness of the division.
How might the growth of Division 3 lacrosse programs impact the overall collegiate lacrosse landscape?
The expansion of Division 3 lacrosse programs could lead to a more competitive and diverse collegiate lacrosse environment. As more schools add lacrosse to their athletic offerings, it provides additional opportunities for student-athletes to compete at the collegiate level. This growth may also contribute to the overall development of the sport, potentially leading to increased talent pools, innovative playing styles, and a broader national interest in lacrosse.
The Division 3 lacrosse commitments for 2023 represent a dynamic and evolving landscape in collegiate athletics. From the geographic distribution of talent to the factors influencing recruits’ decisions, the trends observed in this recruitment cycle offer valuable insights into the future of the sport. As Division 3 programs continue to attract talented student-athletes who prioritize both academic and athletic excellence, the level of competition and quality of play are likely to rise, further cementing lacrosse’s place in the collegiate sports arena.
For high school lacrosse players considering their college options, the Division 3 route offers a unique opportunity to compete at a high level while pursuing rigorous academic programs. The commitments made by the class of 2023 demonstrate the diverse range of institutions and programs available to aspiring collegiate lacrosse players, highlighting the importance of finding the right fit both on and off the field.
As the sport of lacrosse continues to grow and evolve, Division 3 programs will play a crucial role in shaping its future. The commitments made by the class of 2023 are just the beginning of what promises to be an exciting new chapter in collegiate lacrosse, with Division 3 schools at the forefront of fostering talent, promoting academic excellence, and advancing the sport as a whole.
College Commitments
Alexander Adamzyck
Alexander Adamzyck
Alexander Adamzyck
Class of 2020
Arcadia College
NCAA Division III
Nick DeNave
Alexander Adamzyck
Alexander Adamzyck
Class of 2020
Hartford University
NCAA Division I
Nick’s Sendoff
Cole Helmer
Alexander Adamzyck
Michael Hilliard
Class of 20201
Widener University
NCAA Division III
Cole’s Sendoff
Michael Hilliard
Michael Hilliard
Michael Hilliard
Class of 2019
Hood College
NCAA Division III
Evan Karetsos
Michael Hilliard
Evan Karetsos
Class of 2021
Dickinson College
NCAA Division III
Evan’s Sendoff
Dylan Keenan
Michael Hilliard
Evan Karetsos
Class of 2019
Alfred University
NCAA Division III
Dylan’s SENDOFF
Max Kistler
Tyler Schifko
Jack McGorry
Class of 2020
Monmouth University
NCAA Division I
Max’s Sendoff
Jack McGorry
Tyler Schifko
Jack McGorry
Class of 2021
St.
Joseph’s University
NCAA Division I
Jack’s Sendoff
Tyler Schifko
Tyler Schifko
Tyler Schifko
Class of 2021
University of Utah
NCAA Division I
Tyler’s Sendoff
Will Shimer
Gavyn Willson
Tyler Schifko
Class of 2020
University of Lynchburg
NCAA Division III
Reece Wieder
Gavyn Willson
Gavyn Willson
Class of 2020
Nazareth College
NCAA Division III
Gavyn Willson
Gavyn Willson
Gavyn Willson
Class of 2019
New Jersey Institute of Technology
NCAA Division I
NJIT Player Bio/Stats
Colin Johnson
Chuck Kuczynski
Colin Johnson
Class of 2021
Elizabethtown College
NCAA Division III
Colin’s Sendoff
Ethan Storey
Chuck Kuczynski
Colin Johnson
Class of 2021
Colby College
NCAA Division III
Ethan’s Sendoff
Chuck Kuczynski
Chuck Kuczynski
Chuck Kuczynski
Class of 2022
Syracuse University
NCAA Division I
Chuck’s Sendoff
Colin Zyck “CZ”
Troy Scozzafava
Chuck Kuczynski
Class of 2021
St.
Joseph’s University
NCAA Division I
CZ’s Sendoff
Troy Scozzafava
Troy Scozzafava
Troy Scozzafava
Class of 2021
Lycoming College
NCAA Division III
Troy’s Sendoff
Gavin Gibbs
Troy Scozzafava
Troy Scozzafava
Class of 2022
Syracuse University
NCAA Division I
Gavin’s Sendoff
Raul Ochotorena “Ocho”
Raul Ochotorena “Ocho”
Raul Ochotorena “Ocho”
Class of 2021
Lehigh University
NCAA Division I
Raul’s Sendoff
Peter Fabrizio
Raul Ochotorena “Ocho”
Raul Ochotorena “Ocho”
Class of 2021
Belmont Abbey College
NCAA Division II
Sean Farrell
Raul Ochotorena “Ocho”
Sean Farrell
Class of 2021
Lycoming College
NCAA Division III
Sean’s Sendoff
Ben Clark
Cris Cucciuffo
Sean Farrell
Class of 2021
Elizabethtown College
NCAA Division III
Ben’s Sendoff
Cris Cucciuffo
Cris Cucciuffo
Cris Cucciuffo
Class of 2022
St.
Bonaventure University
NCAA Division I
Cris’ Sendoff
Matt Barraco
Cris Cucciuffo
Cris Cucciuffo
Class of 2022
Harvard University
NCAA Division I
Matt’s Sendoff
Marybeth Smith
Marybeth Smith
Marybeth Smith
Class of 2022
La Salle University
NCAA Division I
Marybeth’s Sendoff
Ben Franco
Marybeth Smith
Marybeth Smith
Class of 2021
University of Hartford
NCAA Division I
Ben’s Sendoff
Carter Straub
Marybeth Smith
Carter Straub
Class of 2021
Bentley University
NCAA Division II
Carter’s Sendoff
Julia Cote
Taylor Wikert
Carter Straub
Class of 2022
Bloomsburg University
NCAA Division II
Julia’s Sendoff
Davis Ike
Taylor Wikert
Taylor Wikert
Class of 2022
Trinity College
NCAA Division III
Davis’ Sendoff
Taylor Wikert
Taylor Wikert
Taylor Wikert
Class of 2022
DeSales University
NCAA Division III
Taylor’s Sendoff
Jack Keenan
Aiden Carroll
Ben Scandone
Class of 2022
Arcadia University
NCAA Division III
Jack’s Sendoff
Ben Scandone
Aiden Carroll
Ben Scandone
Class of 2022
Drexel University
NCAA Division I
Ben’s Sendoff
Aiden Carroll
Aiden Carroll
Aiden Carroll
Class of 2022
Aurora University
NCAA Division III
Aiden’s Sendoff
Niko Karetsos
Emily Hollinger
Aiden Carroll
Class of 2023
University of North Carolina
NCAA Division I
Niko’s Sendoff
Emily Hollinger
Emily Hollinger
Emily Hollinger
Class of 2023
Winthrop University
NCAA Division I
Emily’s Sendoff
Liam Drake
Emily Hollinger
Emily Hollinger
Class of 2022
Widener University
NCAA Division III
Liam’s Sendoff
Jake Hurd
Vincent Probst
Vincent Probst
Class of 2022
DeSales University
NCAA Division III
Jake’s Sendoff
Vincent Probst
Vincent Probst
Vincent Probst
Class of 2023
Palm Beach Atlantic
NCAA Division II
Vincent’s Sendoff
COLLEGE COMMITMENTS
MN Elite 2023 Team
| PLAYER | HIGH SCHOOL | COLLEGE | DIVISION |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ruby Burandt | Prior Lake | University of Mount Olive | 2 |
| Elle Busby | Edina | Xavier University | 1 |
| Erin Duggan | Breck | Rutgers University | 1 |
| Izzy Garvin | Benilde St. Margaret’s | University of Vermont | 1 |
| Jenna Hamann | Robbinsdale Armstrong | Concordia St. Paul | 2 |
| Kennedy Herdon | Phillips Academy | UC Berkeley | 1 |
| Brinley Hopper | Eden Prairie | University of Cincinnati | 1 |
| Ellie Morrison | Blake | Dartmouth (Hockey & Lacrosse) | 1 |
| Brooke Nelson | Benilde St. Margaret’s | La Salle University | 1 |
| Megan Sporney | Prior Lake | High Point University | 1 |
| Olivia Tilbury | Burnsville | Fort Lewis | 2 |
| Fayedra Vang | Champlin Park | Liberty University | 1 |
| Mary Velner | Edina | Marquette | 1 |
| Jessica Willhelm | Eastview | Bryant University | 1 |
| Nina Winter | Prior Lake | Marquette University | 1 |
| Tatumn Nyen | Chanhassen | Grand Valley State University | 2 |
| Emily Moes | Lakeville South | UC Berkeley | 1 |
| Carly Johnson | Eastview | Eastern Michigan | 1 |
MN Elite 2022 Team
| Player | High School | College | Division |
|---|---|---|---|
| Payton Bloedow | Prior Lake | Stony Brook University | 1 |
| Bella Detienne | Chanhassen | Northern Michigan Unviersity | 2 |
| Cordelia Flemming | Edina | Columbia University | 1 |
| Leah Hodgins | Chanhassen | Boston University | 1 |
| Siri Hodgins | Chanhassen | Boston University | 1 |
| Taylor Kotschevar-Call | Eden Prairie | Marquette University | 1 |
| Josie Lillquist | Eden Prairie | UC Berkeley | 1 |
| Sayla Lotysz | Rosemount | Marquette University | 1 |
| Claire Nelson | Andover | University of Michigan | 1 |
| Ava Rajala | Minnetonka | Liberty University | 1 |
| Ava Schlitz | Prior Lake | University of Wisconsin – La Crosse | 3 |
| Annika Wozney | Elk River | Eastern Michigan | 1 |
| Courtney Youngquist | Minnetonka | Kent State | 1 |
MN Elite 2021 Team
| Player | High School | College | Division |
|---|---|---|---|
| Elinor Applebaum | Breck | Bowdoin College | 3 |
| Kaylyn Cater | Chanhassen | Grand Valley State University | 2 |
| Sydney Hardy | Chaska | UC Colorado Springs | 2 |
| Cayla Jungwirth | Bloomington Jefferson | Kent State University | 1 |
| Annie McGuire | Stillwater | University of Denver | 1 |
| Grace Peterson | Mound Westonka | United States Naval Academy | 1 |
| Haley Reeck | Edina | University of Louisville | 1 |
| Taiva Reinertson | Apple Valley | Liberty University | 1 |
| Mackenzie Salentre | Prior Lake | University at Albany | 1 |
| Maddy Seifert | Hutchinson | Concordia St. Paul | 2 |
| Rowan Thom | Coon Rapids | Concordia St. Paul | 2 |
| Lorelai Vanguilder | Hill Murray | Marquette University | 1 |
MN ELITE 2020 TEAM
| Player | High School | College | Division |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lydia Akins | Breck | Endicott College | 3 |
| Geneva Berrett | Orono | Bryant University | 1 |
| Maggie Brown | Eden Prairie | University of Southern California | 1 |
| Chloe Fisher | Lakeville North | University of Louisville | 1 |
| Josie Helling | Minnetonka | Kent State University | 1 |
| Hailey Hartlage | Rogers | Concordia St. Paul | 2 |
| Nicole Jerander | Chaska | University of Wisconsin – La Crosse | 3 |
| Josie Kropp | Prior Lake | Marquette University | 1 |
| Olivia Mattis | Lakeville North | James Madison University | 1 |
| Geneva Mattis | Lakeville North | James Madison University | 1 |
| Helen Propson | Edina | MIT | 3 |
| Nina Polk | Prior Lake | Fort Lewis College | 2 |
| Sydnie Soto | Chanhassen | University of Oregon | 1 |
| Ali Styba | Shakopee | Monmouth University | 1 |
| Elle Wagner | Chanhassen | Marquette University | 1 |
MN Elite 2019 Team
| Player | High School | College | NCAA Division |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jordan Anderson | Prior Lake | Robert Morris University | 1 |
| Emilie Bloyer | Eden Prairie | University of Richmond | 1 |
| Eloise Cherian | Breck | Pomona-Pitzer | 3 |
| Laine Ciaramitaro | Apple Valley | Winthrop University | 1 |
| Bella Dervin | Holy Family | Marquette University | 1 |
| Ellie Fedorowski | Stillwater | Concordia St. Paul | 2 |
| CJ Froemming | Eden Prairie | Marquette University | 1 |
| Maia Hodgins | Chanhassen | Concordia St. Paul | 2 |
| Kathryn Kossack | Lakeville North | UC Colorado Springs | 2 |
| Josie Laube | Farmington | Longwood University | 1 |
| Kate Pearson | Eden Prairie | Marquette University | 1 |
| Kacie Riggs | Eden Prairie | UC Berkeley | 1 |
| Leigh Steiner | Holy Family | Marquette University | 1 |
| Lauren Youngquist | Minnetonka | UC Colorado Springs | 2 |
MN Elite 2018 Team
| Player | High School | College | NCAA Division |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chelsea Allie | Mounds View | East Stroudsburg University | 2 |
| Ellie Henry | Eden Prairie | Marquette University | 1 |
| Orianna Johnson | Monticello | University of Hartford | 1 |
| Chloe Lewis | Minnetonka | University of Denver | 1 |
| Beth Mosch | Bloomington Jefferson | Lindenwood University | 2 |
| Molly Moynihan | Apple Valley | University of Louisville | 1 |
| Reagan Roelofs | Apple Valley | United States Naval Academy | 1 |
| Sophie Skallerud | Blake School | Dartmouth College | 1 |
| Christine Steffes | Farmington | Davenport University | 2 |
| Layla Tattersfield | Berkshire Academy | Butler University | 1 |
MN Elite 2017 Team
| Player | High School | College | NCAA Division |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amanda Barian | Prior Lake High School | Grand Valley State University | 2 |
| Hannah Brink | Eden Prairie High School | The Ohio State University | 1 |
| Kamryn Corraro | Farmington High School | University of Detroit Mercy | 1 |
| Mallory Corrigan | Spring Lake Park High School | University of Colorado – Colorado Springs | 2 |
| Carly Goetz | Chaska High School | Virginia Tech | 1 |
| Claire Hagen | Prior Lake High School | Concordia University – St. Paul | 2 |
| Grace Howe | Stillwater High School | Colorado Mesa University | 2 |
| Sammie Morton | Eden Prairie High School | University of Denver | 1 |
| Erica Peterson | Chanhassen High School | Concordia University – St. Paul | 2 |
| Sarah Pierson | Prior Lake High School | Saint Leo University | 2 |
| Raquel Ruhme | Prior Lake High School | University of Colorado Mesa | 2 |
| Lex Seifert | Hutchinson High School | Concordia University – St. Paul | 2 |
| Ashley Steffes | Farmington High School | Butler University | 1 |
MN Elite 2016 Team
| Player | High School | College | NCAA Division |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ally Barian | Prior Lake | Grand Valley State University | 2 |
| Riley Burns | Mahtomedi | Concordia University – St. Paul | 2 |
| Kyla Donovan | Hill Murray | Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute | 3 |
| Brooke Genzler | Lakeville North | Concordia St. Paul | 2 |
| Betsy Gregg | Holy Family | Rockhurst University | 2 |
| Avery Hamill | Paris, Ontario HS | Arizona State University | 1 |
| Kailey Heinl | Mahtomedi | Concordia St. Paul | 2 |
| Victoria Krammer | Bloomington Jefferson | Arizona State University | 1 |
| Annie Lyman | Blake School | University of Denver | 1 |
| Megan Menzuber | Holy Family | Marquette University | 1 |
| Katie Moynihan | Apple Valley | Concordia University – St. Paul | 2 |
| Ashley Norberg | Prior Lake | Florida Southern College | 2 |
| Sabrina Seidl | Mahtomedi | Coastal Carolina University | 1 |
| Sabrina Tattersfield | Berkshire School | University of Vermont | 1 |
| Samantha Tyo | Eastview | Iona College | 1 |
| Lexie Walstad | Chanhassen | Saint Leo University | 2 |
| Megan Yoshida | East Ridge | Grand Valley State University | 2 |
MN Elite 2015 Team
| Player | High School | College | NCAA Division |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alina Del Toro | East Ridge | Niagara University | 1 |
| Abby Hanscom | Holy Family | Gardner-Webb University | 1 |
| Maddy Kuras | Osseo | University of Vermont | 1 |
| Jessica Lagerquist | Eden Prairie | Grand Valley State University | 2 |
| Remi Larson | Stillwater Area High | Lindenwood University | 2 |
| Hannah Magarian | Blake School | Denison University | 3 |
| Hannah Shands | Mahtomedi | Winthrop University | 1 |
| Kaylah Walstad | Chanhassen | Saint Leo University | 2 |
| Holly Korn | Minnetonka/Hotchkiss | Northwestern University | 1 |
MN Elite 2014 Team
| Player | High School | College | NCAA Division |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amber Beuvais | Prior Lake | Wartburg College | 3 |
| Sophie Buelow | Chaska | Lindenwood University | 2 |
| Heidi Colford | Eden Prairie | Wagner College | 1 |
| Izzy Labore-Curtis | Roseville | Butler University | 1 |
| Sydney Evensen | Stillwater | University of Colorado | 1 |
| Jenna Griffith | East Ridge | Wingate University | 2 |
| Jessica Hammer | East Ridge | Adams State University | 2 |
| Samantha Hammer | East Ridge | Adams State University | 2 |
| Oralee Hespenheide | Bloomington Jefferson | Duke University | 1 |
| Anna Johnson | Eden Prairie | University of Colorado | 1 |
| Lauren Kelly | Blake School | University of Louisville | 1 |
| Kallie LaValle | Burnsville | Grand Valley State University | 2 |
| Kaylee Roy | Armstrong | McKendree University | 2 |
| Anne Slusser | Blake School | Duke University | 1 |
| Lydia Sutton | Blake School | University of Southern California | 1 |
| Katie Tomlinson | Eden Prairie | Grand Valley State University | 2 |
MN Elite 2013 Team
| Player | High School | College | NCAA Division |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dana Almquist | Stillwater Area High | University of Louisville | 1 |
| Jaclyn Phillips | Cretin-Derham Hall | Robert Morris University | 1 |
MN Elite 2012 Team
| Player | High School | College | NCAA Division |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meghan Bauer | Blake School | Harvard University | 1 |
| Bailey Dunning | Blake School | University of Denver | 1 |
| Christine Easton | Eden Prairie High School | The Ohio State University | 1 |
Anne Slusser (#22) – a MN Elite 2014 and current MN Elite Coach
NHL teams approach Calgary for Hanifin trade options
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Cold War In 2 vols. Vol. 2 From Postadam to Malta
3 0 2 | CHAPTER 5 |
and “two and a half wars”1. In accordance with this doctrine, it was envisaged to use direct and indirect forms of forceful pressure in order to prevent any actions by the USSR that were undesirable for the United States.
As part of the “flexible response strategy,” the Americans obtained the consent of their European allies in the North Atlantic Alliance to deploy on their territory stockpiles of American nuclear bombs and warheads for operational and tactical missiles, which were under the authority of the Supreme Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, an American general.
Indirectly, this decision meant a sanction for the admission of the FRG to the carriers of nuclear weapons.
Back in 1957, at the December session of NATO, Directive MS-70 was adopted, which provided for preparation for 1964 30 combat-ready divisions of NATO countries equipped with nuclear weapons [29, p. 250]. After that, the equipment of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons carriers began. Since the plans provided for the transfer of nuclear weapons immediately with the outbreak of war, the leadership of the FRG insisted that in peacetime the Bundeswehr should have the appropriate combat equipment and trained personnel for their use. Indeed, soon American tactical missiles “Honest John” (a division equipped with them was later available in each corps), cruise missiles “Matador” of operational-tactical purpose (range – up to 1000 km), tactical aircraft carrying nuclear weapons began to arrive at armament of the Bundeswehr, although control over nuclear warheads remained with the United States [41, p.
190].
In general, by the mid-60s. There were several hundred US military installations in Europe, including about 130 large American air, naval and missile bases. Their network covered Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands –
another part of the world, such as Cuba.
CHAPTER 5 | 3 0 3 |
Luxembourg. As early as 1963, NATO missile units in Europe included divisions of Redstone, Sergeant, Corporal, Honest John missiles, and Lacrosse tactical cruise missiles. Atomic artillery of caliber 280 and 203.2 mm consisted of 26 divisions. The American Sixth Fleet was stationed in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis in order to “be able,” as American newspapers wrote, “in the event of a war, to send their planes with atomic bombs into the heart of Russia” [45].
In 1966-1967 unguided missiles “Honest John” in Germany were replaced by guided missiles “Lance” with a range of up to 75 km, and cruise missiles “Matador” – with more advanced “Maes” [17, p.
308].
In 1963, three American submarines with Polaris missiles, part of the British strategic bombers Vulkan
and Viktor were placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander of NATO Armed Forces in Europe. Canada, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy have also transferred to NATO several squadrons of tactical fighters capable of carrying nuclear bombs. NATO was also assigned aircraft – carriers of nuclear bombs from the French tactical aviation stationed in West Germany. Most of these air attack assets later formed the core of the so-called NATO Mobile Forces. At 1965 they included detached contingents of the ground forces of Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Great Britain
and the USA, as well as parts of the air forces of these countries (excluding Canada) and the Netherlands Air Force [41, p. 265].
However, the main place in the new strategy was occupied by strategic nuclear forces. By 1967, the United States had increased the number of nuclear warheads to more than 2,200 units, launched work on the creation of a missile defense system for certain areas of the United States (Sentinel, then Safeguard), and accelerated preparations for the adoption of missiles with multiple warheads of individual guidance.
The sharply increased arsenal of US nuclear weapons required the creation of a single planning body across the armed forces. As a result, the leadership of the United States
3 0 4 | CHAPTER 5 |
Comrade formed the Strategic Aviation Command (SAC) and the Joint Staff, which was entrusted with the task of determining the targets of enemy destruction and developing a nuclear war plan as a whole. In a short time, the Joint Staff developed a unified plan for conducting a nuclear war. In it,
in particular, there was a variant of the first massive nuclear strike against the USSR and China with the use of about 3500 nuclear weapons with a total capacity of over 7800 megatons. Such a strike, according to the Pentagon, could lead to the destruction of at least 280 million people in the USSR and China. By the summer of 1961, the plan was refined and then approved by President Kennedy.
It was based on the superiority of the USA over the USSR not only in the number of nuclear charges,1 but also in the means of delivering them to targets.
The USSR tried to keep up with the USA: it created powerful nuclear missile weapons of various bases, carried out work on missile defense, and improved air defense. This led to a significant increase in the number of objects that the United States planned to destroy in both counterforce and countervalue strikes. At 19In 1960, there were about 3,000 of them (the 1st unified joint operational plan – SIOP-1), 6,000 targets were named in SIOP-2 (1961), and 10,000 in SIOP-3 (1967) [46]. At the same time, military analysts assumed that the USSR would still be able to inflict “unacceptable damage” on the United States even in a second strike. The same McNamara admitted that “this mutual ability is for both of our countries the strongest of all possible reasons to avoid nuclear war” [47].
McNamara’s analysis of the quantitative ratio of American and Soviet strategic nuclear missile forces and bombers shows that if
in 1960–1965 The United States significantly surpassed the USSR in strategic offensive arms, then already in 1970-1975.
the ratio of forces of the parties
in these weapons looked approximately equal.
Early 70s. Washington realized the new reality of world politics, which was formulated as “the United States at that time had 5,000 nuclear warheads, the USSR had 300 (see: R. McNamara, Through Mistakes to Catastrophe. pp. 19–20).
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tag parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this regard, the “great debate” on this issue was held in the United States. They were attended by leading American experts in the field of international relations and military policy, including Professor S. Huntington of Harvard University, Senator W. Fulbright, former Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs G. Kissinger, Director of the Institute for Problems of Communism at Columbia University Z. Brzezinski, well-known military theorist B.
Brody, retired general M. Taylor, mathematician A. Wohlstetter, consultant to the Ministry of Defense
id. On August 1, 1972, the official conclusion was made that a nuclear war would jeopardize the existence of the United States “as a modern state” [48].
The recognition of this fact caused a public review of American policy. On February 18, 1970, US President R. Nixon, in a message to Congress called “A New Strategy for the Interests of Peace”, called for negotiations with the opposing side not only by force, but also by other means [49]. Two years later, in a message dated February 25, 1972, he stated that in the history of world politics “a whole era has ended, and the United States has entered a period of radical transition into a new phase of international relations” [50, p. 19], and during his visit to Moscow in May of that year, Nixon noted that “in the nuclear age … there is no such thing as security through the predominance of force”1.
Awareness of the real dangers in the nuclear age led L.
I. Brezhnev and R. Nixon, leaders of the two superpowers, to the policy of detente. It is no coincidence that it was in the early 70s. strengthened and further developed the relations of the countries of the Soviet bloc with the states of Western Europe: Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, etc. Thus, in August 19In 1970, a Soviet-West German treaty was concluded, according to which the parties assumed obligations to respect the territorial integrity of all states in Europe, to resolve their disputes by peaceful means, to refrain from using
1 TASS message // Pravda. 1972. May 23.
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Signing of the SALT-1 Agreement. 1972
force and threats of force. The German Democratic Republic was admitted to the UN. Her treaty with Germany (1971) confirmed the inviolability of the western borders of the GDR. Poland and Czechoslovakia also signed agreements with the FRG (1970 and 1973, respectively).
In September 1971, a quadripartite (USSR, USA, Great Britain and France) agreement on West Berlin was signed. Negotiations began on the limitation of strategic arms, on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, and on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.
As a result of negotiations between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT), which began at the end of 1969 in Moscow, in May 1972, two important documents were signed: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Missile Defense Systems (ABM) and the Interim Agreement between the USSR and the USA on Certain Measures in the Field of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (abbreviated name SALT was used in the press -1).
Under the ABM Treaty, which was declared to be indefinite, the Soviet Union and the United States
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you assumed a number of obligations based on the objective relationship between defensive and offensive strategic weapons.
The ABM system was characterized in the Treaty as a system for combating strategic ballistic missiles or their elements on flight trajectories, consisting of anti-missiles, anti-missile launchers and anti-missile radars.
Article I fixed the obligations of the parties “not to deploy missile defense systems on the territory of their country and not to create the basis for such defense.”
Each side was allowed (Article III) to deploy missile defense systems in only two areas:
a) within one area with a radius of 150 km, centered on the capital of that side;
b) within one area with a radius of 150 km, in which silo launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles are located.
In each area, a limited number of components of missile defense systems (anti-missiles, anti-missile launchers and anti-missile defense radars) were provided. In one area, each side was allowed to have no more than 100 anti-missiles. (At 1974, the USSR and the USA signed a protocol to the Treaty, according to which the number of areas for deploying missile defense systems of each side was reduced to one.
)
According to Article V, the parties pledged “not to create, test or deploy missile defense systems or components of sea, air, space or mobile ground-based”.
The USSR and the USA pledged not to transfer to other states and not to place outside their national territory missile defense systems or their components limited by the Treaty (Article IX). The fulfillment of contractual obligations was to be controlled by national technical means in compliance with the generally recognized norms of international law.
It is also important to note that Article XI contained the obligation of the USSR and the USA to “continue active negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms”, while Article XIII
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provided that the parties should “consider, as necessary, possible proposals for further enhancing the viability of this Treaty…”. The indefinite Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems entered into force on October 3, 1972
Another agreement (SALT-1), concluded for a period of 5 years, imposed certain quantitative and qualitative restrictions on stationary launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), launchers of ballistic missiles on submarines (SLBMs) and submarines themselves with ballistic missiles.
The parity level of strategic weapons with their irresistible and enormous destructive power really deprived the opposing sides of the opportunity to use military force to achieve their political goals in a global war, but retained and even in a certain sense increased the risks. In this regard, in addition to the already described and widely known agreements, I would like to highlight agreements little known to the general public, but very important in the context of the conversation about the forced détente, to prevent so-called unauthorized actions (UAA). We are talking about mutual technical and organizational solutions designed to prevent an accidental (equipment failure, human factor) start of a nuclear war.
However, the policy of detente, which was based on the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, caused growing opposition from the influential conservative forces in the United States. Strategic parity was seen by them as a threat to national security.
“The Americans,” wrote the well-known journalist J. Chase, “have always been in search of invulnerability. American leaders—whether through doctrine… or through military systems, or simply by relying on geography—have worked tirelessly to achieve a level of security that is absolute.
There are reasons to believe that the famous Watergate scandal, which led to the early resignation of US President Richard Nixon under the threat of impeachment, was inspired by those
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American political forces, who believed that it was time to draw a line under the policy of détente.
Detente was an important maneuver, but by no means a turnaround in US policy
. It was a question of jointly developing rules, the observance of which would prevent a general nuclear war. Of course, in a certain sense, détente was an open recognition of the fact that the United States (the West as a whole) is not in a position to win a military victory over its historical adversary, but this did not change the
in their eyes the status of the Soviet Union, which remained a mortal enemy for them.
The Soviet leadership was mistaken in considering détente as evidence of the weakening of the West and the “deepening of the general crisis of capitalism.” The wishful thinking was presented as valid, while it was the United States (NATO countries as a whole) that had a pronounced advantage in military-economic and scientific-technical terms over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, the lag of the Eastern bloc became more and more obvious:
The USSR was rapidly losing dynamism in the economy; the growth of its national income has ceased; The “Kosygin reforms”, which initially had a significant effect, were not developed; there was an increasing shortage of advanced technologies. By the mid 80s. the developed states of the West produced 56.4% of the world’s industrial output, while the states of the CMEA – 21.3% [52].
It is customary to regret that the discharge was short-lived. But it couldn’t be otherwise. By reducing the likelihood of a “hot” war, it fulfilled its historic mission and quickly ended because it interfered with the Cold War, which the United States intended to continue to a victorious end.
If we evaluate the period of detente in the traditional way, it should be noted that the parties managed to achieve progress only in those cases when the assessments of the USSR and the USA coincided almost completely, in particular with regard to recognizing the senselessness of a further quantitative buildup of nuclear weapons or the danger of NSD.
But parity, in principle, could not suit the US ruling circles. The same Nixon in 1973, rejecting the policy of “equal to
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security”, said that “the United States cannot entrust its fate entirely or even to a large extent to the good will of others” [53]. And this despite the fact that parity, despite the certain euphoria experienced in the USSR about its achievement, was only an approximate equality in terms of the quantitative parameters of military force: nuclear warheads, their means of delivery, conventional weapons in Europe.
It would seem that the White House has replaced the old “nuclear superiority” doctrine with the new “sufficiency” doctrine. Nixon noted: “Our goal is to be sure that the United States has sufficient military power to protect its interests and maintain those obligations that the administration considers essential to US interests around the world. It seems to me that “sufficiency” would be a better term than superiority or parity” [54]. However, “sufficiency” was not conceived by Washington outside of another doctrinal setting – “realistic deterrence.”
It was based on three main principles: “strength” – striving for superiority in strategic offensive weapons; “partnership” with the allies, with a significant increase in their military contribution to the buildup of the military power of the West; “negotiations” between the USSR and the USA based on force.
In military terms, this doctrine assumed the creation of such a military potential that would ensure the guaranteed destruction of the enemy.
In accordance with the task set, a new classification of wars of the modern era was given: strategic nuclear war, limited nuclear war, conventional war in a theater of operations or in its limited area [55].
In 1973 J. Schlessinger was appointed US Secretary of Defense. Soon, at his suggestion, the White House came to the conclusion that in conditions of parity and quantitative limitation of armaments, only their qualitative improvement would make it possible to achieve an overwhelming advantage over the USSR. Increasing the accuracy of missiles, creating the technical possibility of their rapid re-aiming, and increasing the survivability of strategic and operational-tactical weapons were considered
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as a priority. For example, the Minuteman ICBM modernization program provided for the possibility of retargeting 550 Minuteman-3 missiles within 36 minutes, and the entire Minuteman group within a day [56].
“Memorandum on Decision Making in the Field of National Security” (MRNB-242, 1974) provided for the next expansion of the list of military targets on the territory of ATS countries (command posts, ICBM mines, command posts, airfields, garrisons) in combination with flexible control infliction of nuclear missile strikes in case of war [57]. SIOP-5D, adopted in 1976, already included 40 thousand targets against 25 thousand two years earlier.
“Force remains the main means of resolving potential conflicts… Military force is not the only form of force, but it belongs to the category of the most important in the general set of instruments of force; without it, events will take an unfavorable turn,” Schlessinger argued [56, p. 175].
From the mid-70s. US attempts to change the strategic parity in its favor were stepped up, primarily through qualitative shifts in the nuclear balance. With the coming to power of the R. Reagan administration, the achievement of military superiority over the Soviet Union was again set as the official military-strategic goal of the United States.
