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About me – Benjamin Tully / Bioinformatic Specialist
Ben Tully is a microbiologist & bioinformatian working in the marine environment. He leads the Environmental Bioinformatics lab at the University of Southern California. Research in the lab involves studying microbial communities and functions through the tool of metagenomics – previous and ongoing research has involved the surface ocean, hypersaline lakes, deep-sea oligotrophic sediments, the subsurface marine aquifer, hydrothermal vent fluids, and the human gut. As part of this research, the lab also works to develop new bioinformatic tools and approaches that capitalizes on the growing number of environmental microbial genomes.
The lab supports efforts in generating and propagating open data standards and submission to preprint archives.
Tully received his Ph.D. from the University of Southern California in 2013. In 2014, he joined the Center for Dark Energy Biosphere Investigations as their Bioinformatic Specialist. In 2021, he is joining the Wrigley Institute of Environmental Studies as a Senior Scientist developing research under the Earth & Environmental Systems pillar.
His email is tully dot bj at gmail dot com
Recruiting Ph.D. student(s) for Fall 2022
The Environmental Bioinformatics lab is currently recruiting Ph.D. graduate students to begin Fall 2022. Prospective students will apply to the Marine Biology and Biological Oceanography program within the Marine and Environmental Biology section at USC, with co-advisor John Heidelberg, Executive Director of the Wrigley Marine Science Center.
The position will be partially supported via direct funding from the Wrigley Institute of Environmental Studies – though students are still encouraged to apply for independent support.
I would be happy to collaborate on developing an NSF GRFP proposal.
Components of the Ph.D. project(s) will be developed in coordination with the Wrigley Institute to utilize and support ongoing microbiological research at the San Pedro Ocean Time-series (SPOT) and the Big Fisherman’s Cove Marine Protected Area. And may include understanding microbe-plastic dynamics, microbial xenobiotic degradation, and/or ocean acidification.
I encourage all prospective students to reach out to me directly with an introductory email and CV. This position is perfect if you are prospective students with a strong background in (1) environmental microbiology with a desire learn and develop bioinformatic techniques OR (2) bioinformatics with a desire to learn environmenetal and molecular techniques. Previous experience in the marine environment not required. As a way of supporting all individuals pursuing science careers, particularly persons who have been excluded because of their ethnicity, race, gender, identity, or orientation, I welcome questions about experiences within the department and would be happy to honestly discuss the environment of the department and how it compares with the Environmental Bioinformatics lab.
I am also happy to discuss (regardless of your interest in the lab) what a marine biology Ph.D. can be used for, why you might want to pursue one, and how to approach a graduate career depending on your target career choice.
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A Chat With Gilead Sciences Legal Ops Leader Gary Tully
Next in this series, Rod Osborne talks with Gary Tully, head of legal operations at Gilead Sciences. Tully began his career working in the information technology department of several law firms. When the opportunity to move to the business side arose, he moved to Qualcomm, finding a role where he could balance law, business and technology.
Q: No one has grown up wanting to be a legal operations professional — the role didn’t exist until fairly recently — so how did you find your way into doing what you now do?
A: I started in IT because I loved computers from a very young age and ended up supporting law firms in IT, where I developed an understanding of both legal culture and IT. After receiving my MBA, I decided I wanted to see how larger corporations functioned. I was attracted to a position at Qualcomm, where I supported their legal department in an IT role. I met the new general counsel at Qualcomm and he offered me the opportunity to create a legal operations role. I eventually ended up at Gilead because I saw opportunities to make the legal department a more efficient part of the organization.
Q: When you moved into this new field, were you aware of how other people were doing it or were you pretty much just finding your own way?
A: I was finding my own way.
I ended up connecting with other people who were similarly situated. I would fly to the Bay Area, have dinner and talk about collective challenges, where we can add value and who’s doing what. Legal operations covers a broad range of activities, but most people started with the financial aspects of the legal department. This unofficial professional collective has since manifested into the Corporate Legal Operations Consortium organization.
Q: How has the role of in-house legal operations evolved over the last 10+ years?
A: I was heavily focused on technology when I was at Qualcomm. Part of the challenge was to get certain technologies in place and working well. My role, however, has changed significantly, I sit on a companywide global efficiency task force at Gilead — I now look at organizational structures and processes not just within legal but throughout the entire corporation. The role isn’t just about legal services; it’s about managing the business of legal and budgets, improving processes and creating efficiencies to better leverage legal resources.
Q: What do you find most satisfying about this work?
A: It’s satisfying to add value by successfully transforming the way work is done by freeing up lawyers’ time from unnecessary administrative work. The goal, of course, is to access the untapped value in our legal professionals. Many lawyers are capable of advising business leaders in creative ways, not just on legal issues but on business issues. Lawyers are trained to be creative and consider all sides of a problem. Their way of thinking complements the other skillsets that a business person brings to the table.
Q: What are the greatest challenges you face as the head of legal operations?
A: The greatest challenge is implementing the changes necessary to be most effective. Legal operations people are disruptive by nature and usually find opportunity for efficiencies by changing age-old practices. We tend to challenge the way things are done and people get a little nervous at a very fundamental level.
We experience this challenge with just about every initiative. Every change initiative requires executive-level sponsorship, a clear change management plan and an effective communication plan.
Q: Describe the relationship between legal operations teams and the company’s outside counsel. Where do you see it going from here?
A: One of the primary roles of legal operations is managing the legal finances. We take input and insight from outside counsel and process that information into outputs for finance. We also get involved in the annual rate increase with law firms. Those negotiations open up the conversation about how well outside counsel is doing in an area.
From here, we continue to have meaningful conversations about the quality of work being produced by the firm. We track quality metrics, and firms have been receptive about where they need to improve. We continue to have conversations about how firms secure our data and protect our intellectual property.
We’re also interested in a firm’s diverse makeup — what their profiles are and what their teams bring to the table. We have a lot of efforts around improving the diverse makeup of our workforce, and we’re looking for the same commitment from our suppliers, not just in legal but across the board.
Q: Would it help to have a J.D. or to have practiced law or do you think that could get in the way of what you do?
A: MBAs are essentially trained in operations management, so it comes down to a couple of basic questions: What work do you want your J.D.s and paralegals doing? What skill set do you need to perform the legal operations role? What training and skills are essential to execute that role? Strategic planning, quantitative analysis, budgets, accruals, technology, organizational behavior and structures are all topics of an MBA program. Don’t get me wrong, experience matters but J.D. training does not cover the fundamentals of operations management.
Q: What does leadership mean to you?
A: Leadership is very involved.
For me, it is the ability to make a decision, stand by that position and motivate others through tough times to ensure that the inevitability of change will be a positive. Leadership is providing a vision, being responsible for decisions made and trusting your folks to implement them in a way that can achieve the organization’s goals.
Visit our Modesto,3430 Tully Rd, CA Location
In order to comply with state and local regulations, some restaurants have had to adjust their operating hours. We are committed to serving you your McDonald’s favorites during these challenging times, and are closely monitoring additional restrictions as well as when they are able to be lifted
We are closely monitoring all local, state and federal regulations to provide customers with a contactless pickup experience. As a result of these regulations, some restaurants are only serving customers through the Drive-Thru, while others remain open for carry-out, as well as serving customers through the Drive-Thru, with Mobile Order & Pay on the McDonald’s app and with McDelivery®
The health and safety of restaurant employees and customers is a top priority.
In addition to our standard sanitation procedures, our restaurant teams have:
* Have implemented contactless operations
* Undergo wellness checks before starting their shift
* Are trained on social distancing best practices behind the counter
* Have installed protective barriers at order points
* Are wearing masks or face coverings if unvaccinated (or fully vaccinated and still choose to do so), and gloves for food handling, and ensuring masks are available for managers, crew and customers.
* Have increased the frequency of cleaning, sanitizing, and disinfection of high-touchpoint surfaces
* Are continuing our high standards of promoting regular and thorough handwashing and reminding our crew members of our best practices for personal hygiene
* Where available, are increasing the use of alcohol-based hand sanitizer as a supplement to frequent handwashing
Additionally, new procedures and guidelines for in-restaurant dining include:
* Closing some seating and tables to accommodate social distancing
* Keeping high-maintenance Play Places closed and modifying our dine-in beverage procedures to minimize contact
We are also providing scenario-based guidance to restaurant management on how to work through various COVID-19 related situations, and communicating health and safety guidance updates from federal health authorities.
We will continue to evaluate all safety measures currently in place, and adjust accordingly as we remain focused on the health and safety of restaurant employees and you, our customers.
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Chris Tully, Business Consultant in the DC Metro Region, VA
I Can Help Provide You a Path to Consistent Sales Growth
As a Outsourced/Fractional VP of Sales I can deliver the process and results you expect. If you are ready to take the first step in creating a solid sales foundation, call or email me to schedule a FREE SALES CONSULTATION.
About Me
For over 25 years, I’ve led sales organizations in public and private technology companies, with teams as large as 400 people, and significant revenue responsibility.
I founded Sales Growth Advisors to apply what I’ve learned over my career to help mid-market CEOs execute proven strategies to accelerate their revenue. I have great appreciation for how hard it is to start and grow a business, and it is gratifying for me to do what I am ‘best at’: helping companies grow faster and more effectively. Let’s get acquainted – I am ready to help you with your growth strategy.
I Do The Work For You
My goal is to drive sales growth. I do this with Sales Xceleration’s proven system that focuses on creating record-breaking sales for your company, defined in these 3 steps:
- Create a Sales Plan
- Find Your Best Customers
- Grow Your Sales
|
Therese Tully joined Scandaglia & Ryan in 2003 after working as an attorney with the Federal Trade Commission and as an associate at Jenner & Block LLC. While at the FTC, Ms. Tully participated in several enforcement actions against parties engaged in internet scams, and handled the investigation of a multinational company involved in providing fraudulent medical treatments, during which she coordinated the enforcement efforts of three countries. Ms. Tully also served as a law clerk to the Honorable Martin C. Ashman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois from 1996-1998. Ms. Tully has represented clients in all stages of litigation, many of which involve multimillion-dollar cases. She also has significant experience representing clients in a variety of matters, such as hospitality litigation patent infringement, professional liability, commercial contracts and constitutional law. Cases in Point
Selected Publications and Speaking Engagements
Admissions, Affiliations and Honors
Education
|
Negotiated a highly favorable settlement that resulted in the client obtaining the key relief it sought.
0 out of 5 peer review rating in Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory
5. 2013 | Labyrinth May issue “IL” opens journalistic investigation of American Joby Warrick (1960) “Triple Agent”. Confrontation between the CIA and Al-Qaeda, recruitment, brutal interrogations, fanatical terrorists, the Oval Office, the gorges of Afghanistan, London, Amman, etc., in a word, the full feeling that you are watching a Hollywood movie … it was said that the italics in this book were used in cases where the source of information did not vouch for the literal reproduction of direct speech … And there is very little italics in the book.The translator (in the spirit of the entire publication) is hidden behind the initials – N. N. The ending is in the next issue. “If there is a language worth translating into, it is Russian” – a quote from a conversation between translator and author of an accompanying note, Oksana Yakimenko, with Hungarian writer and screenwriter Laszlo Krasnahorkai (1954), is put into the title of this publication very conveniently. In an interview, the author directly says that, in addition to Kafka, the main ones who pushed him to engage in literature were Tolstoy and Dostoevsky.
And the story “The Birth of a Murderer” published here confirms that the author’s confession, which is flattering for the Russian reader, is not mere politeness. The hero of the story, a restless Hungarian who went to Barcelona, accidentally wanders into an exhibition of Russian icons. But under the impression of the masterpieces of church painting, an outcast of society is about to decide on a desperate step with a taste of Dostoyevshchina.
Heading “Should they survive?” borrowed the title from the story of the Austrian writer Marianne Gruber “Tell them: they must survive” and is timed to the next anniversary of the end of the Second World War.The hero of the story, a Croat peasant boy, resists the crimes of the Third Reich as best he can. Translated by Mark Belorussian.
The Polka Magdalena Tully’s story “Bronek” is dedicated to the phantom memory of the horrors of war that darkens the lives of our contemporaries, whether they are descendants of victims or tormentors.
Translated by Irina Adelheim.
And “The Spaniard in Russia” by Dionisio Garcia Sapico (1929), a sculptor and icon painter from the “Spanish children”, whose childhood, adolescence and youth were spent in the USSR.
“Literary Guide” – “Pre-Raphaelites: a mosaic of genres”.It is about the direction in English poetry and painting, formed in the early 1850s and united by the pathos of resistance to the conventions of the Victorian era, academic traditions and blind imitation of classical models.
Here is what the poet and translator Marina Boroditskaya writes in the introduction to the publication: … only a few names are presented on the pages of the magazine – and practically all the “verbal” genres in which the many-sided “Pre-Raphaelite brothers” tried themselves. Memories, criticism, polemics, essays, poetry and prose … Translations by Maria Falikman, Svetlana Likhacheva, Valentina Sergeeva, Elena Tretyakova, Ekaterina Savelyeva, Alexei Kruglov, Mikhail Lipkin and Vladimir Okun.
Under the heading “Fiction or Non-fiction” – two stories by Krzysztof Konkolewski (1930) from the book “Documentary Tales”, the author who elevated Polish reporting to the rank of pure literature. It is less known that at the same time from under his pen came out works with a greater or lesser degree of fiction, writes in the introduction Polish literary critic and journalist Pavel Goloburda. The cross-cutting theme of these two stories is humanity, trying to resist the onslaught of a heartless world. Translated by Leonard Bukhov.
In the annual heading “Nobel Prize” – “Storyteller”: this is the title of the 2012 laureate Chinese writer Mo Yan (1955).
I know that in the soul of every person there is a certain foggy area where it is difficult to say what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is evil. This is where the talent of the writer can be exploited. And if the work accurately and vividly describes this full of contradictions, vague area, it certainly goes beyond politics and determines a high level of literary skill.
Translated from Chinese by Igor Egorov.
Heading “Translator’s Tribune”. In the article “What remains of the author, or Russian Rilke,” philologist Vera Kalmykova shares her thoughts on the art of translation using the example of the recent extensive publications of the great Austrian poet in Russian.
“Bibliophile”. “Among the books” with Doctor of Philology Nina Pavlova and “Information for Thought. Non-fiction” with Alexei Mikheev.
Streamlined Single Cell TCR Isolation and Generation of Retroviral Vectors for In Vitro and In Vivo Expression of Human TCRs
The effectiveness of the multiplex nested PCR reaction is verified in step 3.2.7 ( fig. 2 ) by running out 5 µl of the second reaction on agarose gel. On average, the efficiency of enhancing TCR-beta is expected to be about 80%, while the efficiency of the TCR alpha reaction is usually lower, about 50% 4 . Only paired TCR-alpha and TCR-beta chains can be used to express TCR; However, all PCR products can be virtualized to obtain TCR sequences and repertoire information.
Gene expression will allow only one TCR beta chain to be expressed in a given T cell.However, T cells are capable of rearranging the second TCR alpha chain, and about 25% of T cells will express the second in the TCR frame of the alpha chain 14 . It is expected that some fraction of the isolated TCR alpha chain will be secondary alpha instead of the “correct” alpha chain. Secondary alpha chains are often not a partner for optimal binding to the TCR-beta chain; Hence, it is assumed that not all cloned TCRs form a stable complex and express on the cell surface. Thus, proper TCR chain conjugation and cell surface expression has been confirmed by transfecting HEK293T cells ( Fig.3A ).
Figure 1 . Streamlined multiplex of nested PCR and development of retroviral constructs from single T cells. Two rounds of PCR lead amplification of the corresponding TCR alpha and beta chains.
Embedded in primers site constraints allow streamlined sub cloning and human / mouse generation of chimeric vector expression into mouse cells. The mouse vector template can be used to easily switch from variable mouse regions to human, creating a chimeric human / mouse TCR retroviral vector compatible with expression in mouse cells.Please click here to view a larger version of this figure.
Figure 2 . Example Single-cell PCR. Multiplex of nested PCR amplification of beta receptor and alpha chain T cells from one human T cells, sorted into one 96-well plate. Shown are the corresponding PCR products (top and bottom) from unicellular amplified TCR beta and alpha-chain TCR from human replication. NC is not a control pattern, PC is a positive control.By running a small portion of the reaction on an agarose gel (5 μL), the efficacy of the single-cell alpha and beta-chain PCR reactions is confirmed up to the PCR product of sequencing . Please click here to view a larger version of this figure.
Figure 3 . Checking cell surface for chimeric TCR expression and specificity. ( A ) HEK293T cells were transfected with mouse TCR or human and mouse chimeric TCR in combination with mouse CD3εγδζ.Cell surface TCR expression was measured with anti mCD3ε antibodies. Strobe strategy: First, the assay is the gateway to positive cells for Ametrin and GFP double (G2). In the case of a single vector, the gating control should be based on a single fluorescence (G1). Second, cells from G1 and G2 are analyzed for the level of CD3ε expression. ( B ) TCR specificity is confirmed by Tetramer staining 293T cells with DRB1 * 0401: GAD115-127 Tetramer. The assay is the gateway to GFP + Ametrin + CD3ε + cells as shown in ( A ).Please click here to view a larger version of this figure.
| Step 2.2 | amounts for good | ||
| PCR reactions (6μL) | (MKL) | ||
| 10 x buffer | 0.6 | ||
| 2 x dNTP | 0.24 | ||
| 10% Triton X | 0.06 | ||
| 3 TCR-specific primers (10 mm pcs.) | 0.23 e.a. (x 3 = 0.69) | ||
| Enzyme | 0.18 | ||
| RNase inhibitor ABS | 0.28 | ||
| NF (nuclease-Free) -h3O | 3.95 | ||
| Step 3.1 | |||
| PCR reaction 1 (25μL) | (MKL) | b PCR reaction 1 (25μL) | (MKL) |
| 5 x buffer | 5 | 5 x buffer | 5 |
| dNTP (10 mm) | 1 | dNTP (10 mm) | 1 |
| DMSO | 0. 75 |
DMSO (3%) | 0.75 |
| pool (primer F) (2.3μM) | 0.3 | b pool (primer F) (2.3μM) | 0.5 |
| Topcoat R (10uM) | 0.6 | b external R soil (10 μm) | 1 |
| DNA polymerase | 0.2 | Jump Taq Polymerase | 0.2 |
| RT-PCR cDNA | 2.5 | RT-PCR cDNA | 2.5 |
| NF-H 2 O | 14.65 | NF-H 2 O | 14.05 |
| Step 3.8 | |||
| PCR reactions 2 – same for and b (25μL) | (MKL) | ||
| 5 x buffer | 5 | ||
| dNTP (10 mm) | 1 | ||
| DMSO | 0.75 | ||
| Adapter F soil (10μm) | 1 | ||
| Indoor R soil (10μm) | 1 | ||
| DNA polymerase | 0. 2 |
||
| Rxn 1 Product PCR | 2.5 | ||
| NF-H 2 O | 13.55 | ||
Table 2.Reverse transcription and PCR reactions.
| Steps, 4.2 and 4.3 | |||
| TRBV digest reaction (50μL) | (MKL) | Digest vector MTCR pMIA (500μL) | (MKL) |
| DNA (~ 20μg) | DNA (~ 20μg) | ||
| MfeI | 2 | MfeI | 20 |
| BstbI | 2 | BstbI | 20 |
| 10 x buffer | 5 | 10 x buffer | 50 |
| H 2 O | H 2 O | ||
| Step 4. |
|||
| CIP reaction (100μL) | (MKL) | DNA (~ 1.5mg) | |
25 Table 3.Vector cloning reactions.
Subscription Required. Please recommend JoVE to your librarian.
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Equipo Nizkor submitted pursuant to resolution 2255 (2015).
Back to top United Nations
Security Council
S / 2016/842
Distr .: General
5 October 2016
Russian
Original: English
Letter from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 1988 (2011) dated 4 October 2016 addressed to the President of the Security Council
I have the honor to transmit herewith the seventh report of the Analytical supporting and monitoring the sanctions established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004), which was submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), in accordance with paragraph (a) of the annex to resolution 2255 (2015).
I would be grateful if this report would be brought to the attention of the members of the Council
Security and issued as a document of the Security Council.
( Signature ) Gerard van Bohemen
Chair
Security Council Committee,
established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)
Letter from the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team from 3 October 2016 addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee, established resolution 1988 (2011)
I herewith enclose the seventh report of the Monitoring Team prepared during implementation of the annex to resolution 2255 (2015).
I would like to especially thank the experts and staff of the United Nations that have done the bulk of the work in Afghanistan in connection with the preparation this and previous reports. The great work they are doing in Afghanistan and in neighboring countries, in a high-risk environment, continues to serve the basis on which the Monitoring Team relies when preparing reports, analyzing data and formulation of recommendations.
The Monitoring Team notes that the original text of this report was drawn up on
English language.
For clarity, the Panel’s recommendations
in bold.
( Signature ) Hans-Jakob Schindler
Coordinator
Analytical Support and Monitoring Team
for sanctions established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004)
Seventh Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, submitted pursuant to resolution 2255 (2015) on the Taliban and to persons and organizations associated with him that pose a threat to peace, stability and security in Afghanistan
| Summary This report provides an update on the situation in
Afghanistan, received since the publication in August 2015 of the sixth
the report of the Monitoring Team (S / 2015/648).Shortly after his death in May 2016
Taliban leader Akhtar Mohammed Mansur Shah Mohammed (Akhtar Mansur)
(TAi.011) The Taliban appointed his successor, Haybatullah Akhundzad (not on the list
listed). Under his leadership, the Taliban managed to slow down the split
movement, which was especially noticeable under Akhtar Mansur. Violence has increased markedly during the current period of hostilities, serious action continues against the provincial administrative centers.The Taliban remain broadly involved in the Afghan drug economy, and the Group’s interlocutors believe that Taliban income growth should be expected in 2016 from this source. In addition, the Taliban remain actively involved in illegal extraction of natural resources in Afghanistan. During the current season During the fighting, the Taliban used improvised explosive devices less frequently, but began to use them more and more often to disrupt socio-economic activities in country outside the areas directly affected by the conflict. In general, the Taliban movement under the leadership of Akhtar Mansur and Khaiba Tulla Akhundzady still refuses to participate in direct negotiations with the government of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, an important achievement was the signing of 29 September 2016 peace agreement with Gulbeddin Hekmaty-rum (QDi.088). The presence in Afghanistan continues to make the situation very difficult several thousand foreign terrorist fighters. Relationship today most of these fighters with the Taliban are symbiotic, mutually reinforcing, but their actions are still subordinate various regional and international interests.Over the past 12 months Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) (listed under the name “Al-Qaeda in Iraq” (QDe.115)) has lost significant territory and lost a large number of militants in the east of the country. However, it is still creates serious problems. ISIS backbone in Iraq and the Syrian Arab The republic continues to try to finance ISIS operations in Afghanistan. At that At the same time, ISIS groups began to form financial flows within the country. The existence of an interconnected network of terrorists in Afghanistan convincingly demonstrates that this threat is not limited to Afghanistan.In the current environment, she is capable of spread to the entire region and other parts of the world. |
In the same time
Taliban generally strengthened relationship with al-Qaeda and related
organizations.
Contents
I. State of the Taliban
II. Reconciliation
III. Organization “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”
IV. Foreign terrorist fighters in Afghanistan
V. Implementation of sanctions
VI. Monitoring Team work
I. State of the Taliban
A. Change of Taliban leadership
1.On May 25, 2016, the Taliban posted on their official websites at Pashto and Dari statement confirming the murder of Akhtar Mansur and the appointment Haybatullah Akhundzada was his successor. This statement confirmed that Mansour was killed on May 21 “in the area between Registan district in Kandahar province and Noshki district of Balochi-stan province “| 1 |. It was also reported that the decision on the appointment of Khaybatullah Akhundzada as Mansur’s successor was made on the basis of consensus by members of the Taliban’s governing body.It was also announced appointment of deputies – Mulla Yakub (not included in the list) and Sirajuddin Jallaludin Haqqani (TAi.144) | 2 |. Later, the fact of Akhtar Mansur’s death was confirmed several member states. The interlocutors of the Group stressed that, in contrast to the appointment of Akhtar Mansur to succeed Mullah Omar in July 2015, the appointment of Hai-batulla Akhundzada appears to have gone relatively quickly and without complications | 3 |. If in 2015 Mansour was forced to negotiate, convince and bribe key Taliban commanders to swear allegiance to him, then Haybatullah Akhundzada received assurances of loyalty from all the main centers of power of the movement The Taliban within weeks of their appointment | 4 |.
2. According to some Member States, in most cases a change in leadership leads to a strengthening of the internal cohesion of the Taliban as a movement. If immediately after the death of Mansour, the intensity of the Taliban’s performances decreased slightly, then by early summer it had become an organized force in the provinces of Helmand and Kunduz. it allowed the Taliban to exert military pressure on the Afghan National Forces defense and security. Under Akhtar Mansur, breakaway radical groups such as Fidayi Mahaz (not listed) (S / 2015/648, para. 6), actively approved as an internal force opposing the Taliban, opposing any effort to improve the negotiation process (S / 2014/888, para. 22).According to information received by the Monitoring Team from Member States, thanks to the leadership style of Haybatulla Akhun-dzada, focused on achieving consensus, and the fact that he is a theologian and not a political or military activist, basically managed to reverse the split of the movement, emerging after 2013 (S / 2014/402, paras. 20-24). However, “expanding the political spectrum movement “also caused a toughening of his position in general with regard to the possible negotiation process.
3. At the same time, not all Taliban are satisfied with the leadership of Haybatullah Akhun-Dzada. 9 august 2016 senior family members of murdered Taliban warlord Mullah Dadullah Akhunda swore allegiance to Haybatulla Akhundzade | 5 |. However, according to Afghans interviewed by the Group, which broke away from the movement shortly thereafter the group “Front of Mansur Dadul-ly” (not included in the list) established a council consisting of 15 members, who elected 25-year-old Mawlavi Mohammad as the new leader of the group Ibrahim Devbandi (also known under the pseudonym Emdadullah) (in the list not appears), who is the nephew of Mansour Dadullah.The front announced non-recognition of Khaybatullah Akhundzada and declared him the murderer of Mullah Omar, Mullah Dadullah and Mansur Dadullah.
4. In addition, the Panel received information from several Member States that with the appointment of Sirajuddin Jallaludin Haqqani (TAi.144) as one of the deputies Akhtar Mansur in 2015 increased the influence of the Haqqani network (TAe.012) on the decision military issues of the Taliban. Its position was further strengthened after the appointment of Haybatullah Akhundzada and the approval by him of Sirajuddin Jallaludin Haqqani for the position of one of the deputies, for which he is supposedly in charge for day-to-day military operations.In the past, the Haqqani network occupied a characteristic a tough stance against any potential political negotiations. V at the end of August 2016, the Taliban appointed Ibrahim Sadar Chief of Military questions, which appears to be a confirmation of his position, since previously, in 2014, he was appointed head of the Taliban’s military commission.
5. With regard to the Taliban’s operational activities during the summer offensive campaigns | 6 |, then Member States and interlocutors of the Group from international circles explained that the death of Akhtar Mansur only briefly affected the Taliban’s operations.In fact, the scale of violence has increased slightly compared to the same the period 2015 (S / 2016/768, paras. 17 and 18). At the same time, according to information, received from several member states, the Taliban began the current season of fighting actions, hoping to capture, at least temporarily, the administrative centers of a number provinces. At the time of writing, the Taliban had failed to achieve this goal. According to information provided to the Group by one of the Member States, the death of Akhtar Mansour, who was killed in May 2016 shortly after the start of the current offensive campaign, caused some disorganization and confusion among various Taliban commanders, especially in southern Afghanistan, and therefore the inability to The Taliban seize the administrative center of at least one province within the current period of hostilities, perhaps also due to a change in leadership, which took place in May.
Q. Current Taliban offensive campaign
6. Although the initial phase of the current period of hostilities appears to have revealed certain deficiencies in coordination between different field commanders of the Taliban in the south of the country, in general, the military situation in Afghanistan by has worsened compared to 2015. The number of combat clashes between government forces and the Taliban increased by a total of 10-13 percent. Afghan National Defense and Security Forces casualties in 2016 increased in comparison with 2015 by 10 percent.Scale of application improvised explosive devices decreased. According to available data, in 2015 such devices were used in about 30 percent of operations, and this year, according to reported in 18 percent of transactions (ibid.). Member States and Afghan authorities explained to the Group that the Taliban are increasingly using improvised explosives devices to destroy civilian infrastructure, for example to block roads important for the country’s economy. For example, the interlocutors of the Group from different countries said that during the current fighting in Helmand province, the Taliban have installed so many improvised explosives on paved roads devices that civilians fundamentally stopped using roads in provinces, preferring to move on the side of the road rather than on the asphalt.According to information provided to the Monitoring Team by senior officials in Kabul, fighting intensified in early 2016 between the Taliban and the Afghan National Defense Forces and security in the provinces of Helmand, Ghazni, Paktika, Nangarhar and Kunduz. Interlocutors from Afghanistan and other countries, describing the current security situation in the southern regions of Afghanistan, noted the increasing military pressure of the Taliban on background of his increasingly vigorous efforts to strengthen ties with local tribal groups.
7. Interlocutors of the Group from Afghanistan and other countries highlighted that during the current period of hostilities, the Taliban are paying increased attention to the province Helmand. According to information received by the Group from one of the member states, the Taliban leadership plans to transfer part of the militants and considers the province of Helmand one of the most suitable places for this. Afghan officials said a number of key leaders such as Mohammad Naim Barish (TAi.013), head of the military commission Ibrahim Sadar (in not listed), Hafiz Muhibullah Barakzai (not listed) and a new the head of the Taliban security service, Mulla Shirin (not included in the list) listed) are already in the country.
8. According to information provided to the Panel by several Member States, there is reason to fear that the Taliban in the north of the country is attempting to establish control over the border between Afghanistan and the republics of Central Asia.This would allow the Taliban not only to smuggle drugs out of the country uncontrollably, but in principle, it is illegal to receive and transport weapons and ammunition to Afghanistan across this border.
9. Submissions from several Member States stressed that further international support for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, including air support, remains of strategic importance as a factor containment of ongoing Taliban military pressure in the country.
S.Taliban and Al-Qaeda
10. In communications received by the Group from several Member States, especially it is noted that during the period when Mansour headed the Taliban, the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, especially its main composition, were strengthened and that with the appointment of Khaybatulla Akhundzada to replace him did not change this tendency. How noted the Monitoring Team in its latest report (S / 2016/629, paras. 1 and 2), their unity was demonstrated on May 31, 2016, when al-Qaeda on Arabian Peninsula “(AQAP) (QDe.129), “” Al-Qaeda “in the countries of the Islamic Maghreb “(AQIM) (QDe.014) and the Front for the People of the Levant” Al-Nusra “(QDe.137) published a joint obituary praising Mansur signed by all three in groups. This was followed on June 16 by a similar statement by al-Qaeda on Indian subcontinent “. May 27, 2016 the current leader of Al-Qaeda Ayman Mohammed Rabi al-Zawahiri (QDi.006) declares his loyalty to the new leader of the Taliban movement Haybatullah Akhundzade | 7 |.
11. Former leader of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan Nayef Salam Muhammad Ujaym al-Hababi, also known as Farouk al-Qatani (QDi.390), left the country, and his the current whereabouts are not known exactly. Al-Qaeda is now in Afghanistan headed by Rasul Khan (not listed), a citizen of Afghanistan, the son of Adam Khan. According to information provided by Afghan security officials, the current composition of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is very different from the Taliban and its role and outlook: al-Qaeda members have a higher level of education, they are more ideologically savvy and think more strategically.
12.Thus, during the current offensive campaign, al-Qaeda militants and, in particular, elements that pledged their allegiance to AKIS were more active in supporting warring groups Taliban. According to information from several Member States, the militants Al-Qaeda have acted as specialist trainers for Taliban groups in in particular, for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices | 8 |. In addition, one of Member States noted the presence of AKIS fighters in Helmand province – the first time that AKIS fighters were identified as a separate group in southern part of Afghanistan.
13. Representatives of the Afghan authorities and other Member States reported that in addition to AKIS militants continued to operate independently in northern Afghanistan Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (QDe.010). At the end of 2014, part of the IMU joined the activated cells of the organization “Islamic State Iraq and the Levant ”(ISIL) in Afghanistan (S / 2015/648, para. 19), and the other part of the group continued operations in the north of the country.
14. Finally, if in 2015 militants loyal to Pakistan-based groups associated with al-Qaeda such as Lashkar-i-Taiba (QDe.118) and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan ”(TTP) (QDe.132), who relocated to Afghanistan, fleeing military pressure exerted on them by the Zarb-e-Azb operation (ibid., paragraph 2), fought in separate groups in eastern Afghanistan, then during the current period fighting, they appear to have entered various Taliban militant groups and ceased to be separate operational units. In this regard, Afghan officials informed the Group about an increase in the number of fighters arrested Taliban of Pakistani origin, operating in Afghanistan.
D. Sources of funding for the Taliban and their links to crime organizations
15. An analysis of the Taliban’s sources of income suggests that they remain highly diverse and that this diversity allows the Taliban to quickly compensate for the reduction in the inflow of new receipts. Afghan officials and Member State representatives consider that the main sources of income Taliban are (in decreasing order of importance) drug trafficking, mining minerals, kidnapping for ransom and external donations.In 2015, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recorded a decrease in the total opium production in Afghanistan by about 19 percent | 9 |. At the same time, according to according to the interlocutors of the Group from different countries, in 2016 the total production volume may increase by another 10 percent. Interlocutors of the Group from different countries explained that this potential growth is due to favorable climatic conditions in 2016 year, as well as a significant increase in the production of opium poppy in the northern regions countries, especially in the provinces of Balkh, Badghis and Faryab.This will also allow offset the expected decline in opium poppy production due to constant fighting in Helmand, one of the leading provinces in the country by opium poppy production | 10 |. Thus, according to UNODC estimates, in 2016 crops poppy seeds and their yields are likely to increase and the Taliban will receive from the underground drug economy up to $ 400 million per year, which is about 50 percent of its income | 11 |.
16. According to Afghan officials, the drug economy directly or indirectly employs approximately 3 million Afghans.High-ranking representative of Afghanistan noted that due to the massive involvement of the Taliban in the drug trade, disappeared the line between drugs and terrorism. Indeed, if you put on top of each other maps of areas for planting and cultivation of narcotic plants and maps of areas countries where the Taliban have concentrated military forces and means to preserve their stable presence, vast areas will coincide | 12 |. By attacking key checkpoints and using money and agreements, the Taliban are transporting unprocessed poppy from Helmand province and southern Afghanistan to the north-east of the country for chemical processing, from where it is transported again south for export from the country.
17. Illegal mining remains an important source of income for the Taliban. fossils. Afghan officials as well as interlocutors of the Group from other countries reported that since the publication of the Panel’s sixth report (S / 2015/648) the situation in this area has not dramatically improved. As noted by the Group in its 2015 Special Report on Taliban Cooperation with Organized crime (S / 2015/79), the Taliban are still directly involved in this sector, controlling illegal mining sites, in particular in the south and east of the country, extorting fees from licensed Afghan miners and speaking intermediaries in the transportation of other illegally obtained natural resources.it the Taliban’s ubiquitous presence in illegal mining has also recently attracted attention of the international community | 13 |. During the Group’s recent visit to the country, she also received information from representatives of the provincial administrations that the Taliban constantly attack mines and mining companies with the aim of either seizing the mines themselves or extorting money from operating legitimate miners enterprises.
II. Reconciliation
A. Gulbeddin Hekmatyar and Hizb-i-Islami
18.Afghan officials told the Panel that since the beginning of 2016 intensified regular contacts of the government of Afghanistan with the organization Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (not listed) and its leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Thanks to these contacts, there was a potential opportunity reaching an agreement on reconciliation with Hizb-i-Islami. May and June 2016 an exchange of views took place between the Supreme Peace Council and Hizb-i-Islami on the establishment of conditions for the conclusion of a peace agreement, according to which, in general, the latter must cease hostilities, sever ties with all terrorist groups and other illegal armed groups and cease their further support and recognize the Constitution and laws of Afghanistan.The Government of Afghanistan in its the queue agreed to create conditions for Hizb-i-Islami to be presented in state institutions | 14 |. Among other things, the government pledged also consult with the Security Council, certain countries and others structures on the issue of the earliest possible lifting of the restrictions imposed by them against Hizb-i-Islami, its leadership and members.
19. The agreement was initialed by representatives of the Government of Afghanistan and Hizb-i-Islami September 22, 2016 | 15 | and officially signed by the president Afghanistan by Ashraf Ghani on September 29, 2016 and Hekmaty-rum on videoconference with the presidential palace in Kabul.The ceremony was broadcast in live on television. The completion of this process can be considered explicit a sign of progress in the reconciliation process as a whole. Some interlocutors of the Group expressed the view that the process that ended with the signing of Hizb-e-Islami reconciliation agreements can also be seen as a scheme for reconciliation with other groups. However, other delegations noted significant structural differences between Hizb-i-Islami and the much less hierarchically organized The Taliban, who are likely to require a significant adjustment in their approach to the process of concluding a reconciliation agreement with the Taliban.However, according to member states, if reconciliation with Hizb-e-Islami is sustained, it will a highly symbolic achievement of the Afghan government.
B. Taliban
20. In January 2016, Afghanistan, China, the United States of America and Pakistan formed a Quadripartite Coordination Group to create conditions for peace talks with the Taliban | 16 |. Member States informed the Group that despite significant efforts made by all members of the Group to begin direct talks between Kabul and the Taliban, the Taliban spoke 5 March 2016 with a statement that at present he does not intend to accept participation in negotiations | 17 |.
21. Several Member States informed the Group that under the leadership of Akhtar Mansour’s Taliban were reluctant to negotiate and that this position was not has changed since Khaiba Tullah Akhundzada became the leader of the Taliban. Assessment of these member states is that, although as a senior cleric Khaybatullah Akhundzada has a strong ideological mandate, his consensus leadership style will for a time limit his ability to exercise control, even if he wishes to start negotiations for reconciliation.According to Afghan officials and a number of international partners of the Group, most of the political Taliban leaders believe the current season of fighting is was successful for them, and they continue to believe that they can win the conflict by military means. Thus, at the moment, the leadership of the movement has no incentives. get involved in the strategic negotiation process.
22. In February 2016, Pir Sayed was appointed the head of the High Council for Peace Ahmad Gailani.The former second Vice President Karim Khalili, former Governor of Bamian Habib Surabi, Mawlavi Ataur Rahman Salim and Mawlavi Abdul Habir. Afghan officials explained The group that the High Council of the World is currently fully operational and therefore, if the Taliban are willing, they can hold serious negotiations with them. Partners The groups stressed that some changes were being made to improve the work of the Council. V the new proposal will reduce the composition of the Council from 73 to about 50 members.These 50 members will be distributed among the three main committees and additional ad hoc committees to be established in the event necessity. The work of these committees will be based on the revised strategy Council, which outlines a five-year plan for the organization to achieve “peace and prosperity ”based on three key elements: guiding the implementation of peaceful initiatives; further development of peace initiatives; and promoting social peace and justice for all Afghans.
III. Organization “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”
23. The position of ISIL in Afghanistan has clearly weakened since 2015 (S / 2016/629, paras. 18 and 19). Afghan government officials said that during their maximum influence in 2015, this organization temporarily controlled up to nine counties in the province of Nangarhar. However, at present, its influence has diminished and the most active part of the organization controls at best three and a half counties in this province.At the same time, the number of ISIS fighters declined as a result of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces counterattacks and air strikes international forces. The organization’s ability to capture and hold territory was also blown up by clashes with Taliban militants in the fight for the sphere of influence on the ground and, in particular, for resources, finance and labor.
24. Several Member States informed the Panel that the number of ISIS fighters in the eastern part of Afghanistan fell to about 1,600 people, of which more 700 are foreigners; these fighters are mainly located in Da Bala districts, Kot, Achin and Naziyan in the province of Nangarhar | 18 |.About 200 ISIS fighters are based in province of Kunar. According to reports from the Group’s Afghan and international partners, some ISIS fighters are trying to move from the provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar to the province of Nuristan. Small ISIS groups operate in Laghman provinces, Badakhshan and Baghlan (in Burka and Nahrin districts), as well as in the provinces of Kunduz and Zabul, in particular in Kakar County. In northern Afghanistan, ISIS works with organization “Jundalla” (not listed), which is associated with the TPP.
25.Afghan government officials and a number of member states confirmed in their communications to the Group that Hafiz Said Khan (not listed), one of the leaders of ISIS in Afghanistan, was killed in an air strike, inflicted on July 26, 2016. Several Member States explained to the Group that nearly half of ISIS members in Afghanistan are of non-Afghan origin, moreover, a significant part of the militants arrived from the area on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISIL has lost significant number of former Taliban fighters who have chosen to return to traffic during 2015.Nevertheless, ISIS continues to attract disgruntled Taliban fighters. One of the specific risk factors about which The team has been advised by Member States that there is a potential recruitment of returnees Afghan refugees from ISIS. According to reports from Member States, ISIL able to pay its fighters about $ 500 in reward for joining its ranks.
26. In 2015 and 2016, this organization continued to conduct an active propaganda campaign in Afghanistan.For example, according to the words Afghan officials, the key to these efforts continues to be mobile radio used by the organization despite three successful operations by Afghan and international forces to stop the work of the station. Besides, the organization actively distributes propaganda materials via the Internet. According to information received from the Group’s Afghan partners, ISIS Department Sultan Aziz Ezan heads on propaganda in Afghanistan (not on the list listed), professional video producer and journalist, graduate of Jalalabad university.In the provinces of Nangarhar and Khost, ISIS is also distributing so called “night letters” to intimidate the local population and supporters government of Afghanistan.
27. Estimated by a number of Member States and Afghan officials security, relations between ISIS and the Taliban are developing in different ways in different regions of Afghanistan. In some provinces, in particular in Kunduz and Kunare, ISIS fighters interacted with warring factions of the movement Taliban and avoided clashes.However, in other parts of the country, both organizations fought for resources, territory and sphere of influence. This is especially common took place in the eastern part of the country, in particular in the province of Nangarhar. Nevertheless Afghan officials told the Group that despite regular clashes between the Taliban and ISIS in the province of ISIS continue to is willing to pay Taliban field commanders a salary of $ 1,000. US a month if they agree to cooperate with ISIS and not oppose it.
28. In addition to the eastern part of Afghanistan, both organizations also fought in provinces of Farah and Helmand, where the Taliban managed to defeat various ISIS groups. According to a number of Member States, one of the main reasons confrontation between the Taliban and ISIS is their desire to control drug business. According to information received from a number of Member States, in 2015 ISIS acquired and then burned the opium poppy crop in the areas under its control, in the province of Nan Garhar.The Afghan authorities informed the Group that in other areas of the country, ISIS fighters stopped and destroyed drug shipments, belonging to the Taliban.
29. Several Member States told the Group that most of the ISIS in Afghanistan is funded externally. Central Leadership ISIS in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic has made efforts to provide financial support for ISIS in Afghanistan, as it has done for others ISIS groups outside the region.Afghan partners informed the Group on observing that ISIS is also receiving external support in the form of individual donations from other parts of the region. According to a number of Member States, some ISIL’s external financial support comes through informal channels such as Hawala. However, some Member States informed the Panel that ISIL also began to seek sources of income in Afghanistan: it is engaged in extortion among merchants and local people; uses as a source of income kidnapping for ransom; and sells illegally harvested wood.Afghan officials explained to the Group that ISIS fighters receive small monthly payments; nevertheless, their families are provided housing, food, clothing and other essential items. Summer 2016 Afghan authorities arrested ISIS chief financial officer in Afghanistan Azan Gul (not listed).
IV. Foreign terrorist fighters in Afghanistan
30. According to estimates by a number of Member States and Afghan government officials, the armed opposition in Afghanistan has a total complexity of about 45,000 combatants.Of these, non-Afghan militants make up, according to an estimated 20-25 percent. Several senior partners of the Group have qualified the current situation in Afghanistan as a “revelry” of malefactors who mutually reinforce each other and represent a significant and growing terrorist a threat not only to the country, but also to the international community.
31. Afghan partners have suggested that foreign terrorist fighters in the country can be roughly divided into four groups. The first and largest group currently participating in the hostilities in Afghanistan, is of the approximately 7,500-7600 people who fled Pakistan as a result military operation “Zarb-e-Azb” there and now they are fighting on the side of the Afghan Taliban.They are fighters from the following organizations: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (QDe.132), Lashkar-i-Taiba (QDe.118), Lashkar-i-Jangvi (LJ) (QDe.096), Jaish-i-Mohammed (QDe.019), Harakat ul-Mujahidin / NiM (QDe.008) and others.
32. According to Afghan officials, Lashkar-e-Taiba fighters, for example, provide training for Taliban recruits in Mae Wand province Kandahar. A 250-strong militant group supporting Harakat ul-Mujahideen collaborates with the Haqqani Network in Paktia province (TAe.012). In the summer of 2016, this organization, led by Abdul Haq Ayyubi and based in Dand-Wa-Patan and Jaji districts in Paktia province, participated along with the Afghan Taliban in the attack on Hisarak district. To this attack Uzbek-Sko-Uyghur foreign terrorist fighters also joined.
33. A second group of foreign terrorist fighters reportedly includes persons from China, the Russian Federation and Central Asia. These fighters are now time are on the side of the following organizations: IMU, Islamic Movement East Turkestan (ETIM) (QDe.088), Islamic Jihad Group (QDe.119), Jundallah (not listed) and Jamaat Ansarullah (not listed). Afghan officials told the Group that in recent months about 300 militants from Central Asia, along with their families, arrived in Daichopan districts, Arghandab and Kakar in Zabul province.
34. It was reported that many militants are also active in the north of Helmand province. of Uzbek and Tajik origin. Afghan authorities believe they can be members of Imam Bukhari’s Katibat group (not listed) who took the oath of allegiance to the new leader of the Taliban movement Haybatullah Akhundzade and were previously transferred from the Syrian Arab Republic to Afghanistan (S / 2016/629, paragraph 19).Senior Afghan officials estimate that these fighters are in Afghanistan in order to build a network of supporters in the provinces in the northern and northeastern parts of the country and thereby gain experience, networking and, perhaps prepare to return to their countries of origin. IMU and IDVT work closely with the Afghan Taliban, although they often associate themselves with ISIS. This should be seen as a symbiotic relationship in which cooperation is beneficial for both partners.
35. The third group of foreign terrorist fighters includes members of ISIS, located mainly in the provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar. About 1600 militants, who hail from neighboring countries, are based in the province of Nangarhar, and 200 – in the province of Kunar. Foreign ISIS terrorist fighters in Afghanistan occur mainly from three tribes in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan: orakzai, hiber and bajaur.
36. The fourth group of foreign terrorist fighters in Afghanistan includes Al-Qaeda representatives who are part of AKIS.They are currently fighting for spheres of influence in Afghanistan. Afghan officials came to the conclusion that there are between 400 and 600 al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan who are found mainly in the southern, eastern and northeastern provinces of the country. In 201 6, 120 families of al-Qaeda members moved to the Khogiani district of the province Nangarhar. Al-Qaeda members are not actively involved in hostilities in Afghanistan, while acting mainly as permanent instructors and advisers for the Taliban, Seti Haqqani, Lashkar-e-Taiba and the IMU.
37. Most Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Afghanistan Need Help Afghan Taliban asylum seekers, in connection with which many intend use Afghanistan as a launching pad for achieving main goals in their home countries. Presence of the Taliban and related groups in the north country, namely in the provinces of Kunduz and Badakhshan, is an example of this symbiotic relationship. Therefore, senior Afghan officials stressed that they are considering the threat this poses today to Afghanistan as having an international character and emerging at a time when Afghanistan is unable to independently control the situation.They also stressed that this problem could be exacerbated by an influx of up to one million Afghan refugees expected to return from Pakistan in 2016 | 19 |. Senior Afghan officials are currently concerned that the return of large numbers of refugees can create fertile ground for recruitment by a number of radical groups in Afghanistan.
V. Implementation of sanctions
A. Travel ban
38. The implementation of the travel ban for listed individuals remains challenging.The Monitoring Team continues to monitor regularly received but unconfirmed reports in national, regional and international media on international travel of the persons on the list. Most of these posts state that travel by these listed individuals is related to ongoing efforts to initiate direct negotiation process between the Taliban and the government Afghanistan. The Monitoring Team has not received an official confirmation of any of these potential violations.
39. The travel ban imposed by resolution 1988 (2011) remains a powerful sanctions tool that the Taliban previously subjected to criticized, noting that he does not allow him to move freely (S / 2015/648, para. 33). Thus, strict adherence to the travel ban with respect to all appearing on the list of individuals still represents an opportunity to maintain leverage over the leadership of the Taliban movement. In this regard, it should be noted that, according to reportedly a key factor in a potential reconciliation between Gulbeddin Hekmatyar and the Afghan government is that the government will agree commit to undertaking with the Security Council of the Organization The United Nations consultation on the earliest possible lifting of the sanctions, imposed on Hekmatyar.Hekmatyar is currently on the list, ongoing in connection with the sanctions regime against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda.
40. According to the Taliban, at the time of his death, Mullah Mansur was in area “between the Registan district of Kandahar and the Noshki district of Be-Lujistan” | 20 |. From press statements, some of which appear to have been made by a spokesperson Taliban Zabihullah Mujahid, it follows that before his death, Mansur went to other countries for meetings and fundraising.Senior officials the Afghan governments have also confirmed that they know Mansour traveled throughout the region. This indicates the danger that some listed individuals can obtain identity documents using false or forged documents.
41. Provision of biometric data, in particular photographs and prints fingers, is one of the tools with which you can more effectively implement the travel ban.Biometric data allows you to set the identity of people regardless of the identity in potential travel passes documents. Over the years, the Group has worked with Member States to collect such data for their inclusion in special notifications of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the Security Council Organization United Nations (S / 2014/402, paras. 38 and 39). This resulted in significant an increase in the amount of biometric data provided in relation to persons, included in the 1988 (2011) sanctions list.Together with topics in data sets for important persons, for example, for Akhtar Mansur, are still missing verified photos.
42. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee invite Member States provide photographs of persons currently on the sanctioned the list of resolution 1988 (2011), for inclusion in the relevant special Interpol and United Nations Security Council notices, as requested by the Committee in 2014.
43. During the discussions with the Panel and experts from Interpol and several national law enforcement authorities highlighted the fact that in the case of Fingerprint The most important data format is ANSI / NIST-ITL | 21 |.
44. In order to ensure wider international compatibility of data on fingerprints submitted by the Committee, Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee send letters to Member States urging those States that have not yet done so, submit to the Group and the Division for Security Council fingerprints of listed individuals (if any available), for inclusion in special notifications of Interpol and the Council United Nations Security in ANSI / NIST-ITL 1-2007 format.
B. Asset freeze
45. Afghanistan continued to develop its legal and regulatory framework to combating the financing of terrorism. This work is carried out in close collaboration with the Financial Action Task Force. A key role in this Communications is played by the Afghan Financial Transaction Analysis and Reporting Center (Fin-TRAKA), which is Afghanistan’s financial intelligence service. After editions of its third report (S / 2013/656, para. 49) the licensing process for non-bank financial service providers in Afghanistan.This process continues and expands in most of the provinces of the country. Fin-TRAKA publishes lists of licensed suppliers on its website non-bank financial services for each region of the country | 22 |.
46. The licensing process for non-bank financial service providers, which The group considers what is arguably the best practice in the region, enhanced by provision of information related to the sanctions by Fin-TRUCK. On his The Fin-TRAKA website has links to the Sanctions List of Resolution 1988 (2011) and ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda Sanctions Lists | 23 |.In addition, Afghan officials informed the Group that an unofficial translation of the list of resolutions 1988 (2011) in Dari and Pashto, was especially useful for their daily work in implementation of the relevant provisions on sanctions | 24 |. Dari and Pashto lists were granted to all provincial governors, who in turn circulated them to the appropriate financial entities in their respective provinces. In case of identification of transactions, presumably related to those included in list of individuals or organizations, provincial branches of “Fin-TRAKA” report this to Kabul, where such reports are checked against official English the text of each of the sanctions lists.If a match is found, the respective funds are frozen. Afghan officials explained To the group that, although in the past every freeze of funds required specific instruction of the Attorney General of Afghanistan, 20 July 2016 The Attorney General of Afghanistan has issued a decree allowing freeze funds when compliance with the current and all future updated Sanctions Lists of Resolution 1988 (2011) and Lists on ISIS (Daesh) and Al-Qaeda | 25 |.
47. On September 1, 2016, new versions of the sanctions lists entered into force, in which positions were arranged in alphabetical order and each of them was assigned permanent reference number. As a result, the website addresses of the list have changed. Resolution 1988 (2011) and the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Lists.
48. Considering that Fin-TRAKA and other state bodies regularly consult these lists on the website of the respective committees Of the Security Council, the Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee send all Member States note verbale showing new website addresses the 1988 (2011) Sanctions List and ISIL Sanctions Lists (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda.
49. The Taliban continue to engage directly and through intermediaries in illegal exploitation of natural resources in Afghanistan. | 26 | According to the Monitoring Team, to which she came after discussing this issue with the government of Afghanistan, and also with several Member States, such exploitation of natural resources continues to be a significant source of income for the Taliban and also undermines economic development of the country, as non-renewable natural resources are stolen from it resources.The group began to collect information on this issue after its release. fourth report (S / 2014/402, paras. 51-54) To create barriers that can limit the Taliban’s ability to generate assets in this way, only to strengthen internal control over the industry of Afghanistan, but also to increase awareness of international clients about natural resources coming from Afghanistan.
50. Extortion by the Taliban from legal and licensed Afghan mining enterprises is a matter of internal enforcement, which is currently being addressed by the government of Afghanistan | 27 |.In addition, the government is collaborating with the Initiative to ensure transparency in the extractive industries of the International Monetary Fund, with to increase transparency in the industry in Afghanistan | 28 |. This work will also contribute to the strengthening of barriers to prevent the implementation of Taliban extortion among legitimate mining companies in the country. In addition, the Taliban’s ability to generate assets from exploitation natural resources, which he himself illegally extracts, is a matter for which may also be subject to the sanctions regime of resolution 1988 (2011).The Taliban are forced to sell such natural resources on the international market. So way, the specified resources and financial transactions associated with the intersection international borders are subject to international control. As noted in the Panel’s special report on cooperation between the Taliban and criminal organizations (S / 2015/79) controlled by the Taliban illegally obtained natural resources enter the global market using counterfeit documents of origin (ibid., paragraph 25).
51. In the course of further discussions with the Group and sector experts and the government of Afghanistan and several other member states was re-emphasized the fact that stricter adherence and implementation of due diligence procedures due diligence on the part of international clients requires more information the networks involved in this illegal asset generation process, and the geographical location of these illegal mines.
52. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee send a note verbale to all Member States urging those who have not yet done so to raise the awareness of relevant private sector stakeholders that natural resources illegally extracted in Afghanistan can also used to enrich the Taliban.
53. In addition, the Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee send Member States, a note verbale asking them to submit requests for possible listing of international marketers natural resources illegally obtained by the Taliban.
54. Finally, the Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee assign continue to cooperate with the Government of Afghanistan and with relevant private sector stakeholders to explore opportunities with with the help of which more detailed information about the location of illegal mines in Afghanistan can be extended to appropriate government and industry actors.
C. Arms embargo
1. Improvised explosive devices
55. While the overall use of improvised explosive devices has declined by as part of the ongoing military campaign | 29 |, the Group continues to receive from Member States documents showing that the supply of components of such devices, such as detonators, detonating cord and remote detonating devices, and also precursors for improvised explosives, continues.All participants groups stressed that the Taliban did not appear to be experiencing deficiency of these components. In his recent report on countering the threat, created by improvised explosive devices, the Secretary-General called Afghanistan is one of the countries hardest hit by improvised explosive devices, and emphasized that 10 times more died from such devices in Afghanistan civilians than from landmines (A / 71/187, paras. 5 and 11). Also, how noted above, the Taliban also use improvised explosive devices in as a political tool: by destroying civilian infrastructure, the Taliban undermines the Afghan government’s ability to provide services to the population.Accordingly, any reduction in the supply of such components to the Taliban will not will only ensure stricter implementation of the arms embargo, but may entail positive political consequences.
56. As noted in the Panel’s sixth report (S / 2015/648, paras. 52-53), several years of the regulatory framework for the import and sale of civil components that can be used for other purposes in production improvised explosive devices have undergone significant changes in Afghanistan.Thus, strengthening control at the level of the industry producing these components, provides an opportunity to enhance the impact of the arms embargo in this regard. V the latest report of the Secretary-General also highlights this issue and it is recommended that national codes of conduct be developed for relevant industries (A / 71/187, recommendation 1). The monitoring team continually emphasizes the importance of such industry guidelines since its third report (S / 2013/656, paragraphs 59-66).The group will continue to collaborate with relevant industries and regional initiatives such as Istanbul process to further raise awareness of this issue.
57. Report of the Secretary-General on countering the threat posed by homemade explosive devices, is the most important document and contains a number of important recommendations for member states. In this regard, a deeper understanding of the report and the recommendations it contains is essential.
58. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee explore options such as holding workshops to disseminate the report of the General Secretary (A / 71/187), e.g. through the Organization’s Resident Coordinators The United Nations in the region, among relevant actors involved in this question. The monitoring team is ready to organize presentations within such workshops.
2. Weapons and ammunition
59. Along with components of improvised explosive devices, they continue to cause concerns about the supply of arms and ammunition to the Taliban.Government Afghanistan, as well as all international partners with whom the Group was in contact on this issue, highlighted the fact that not once in the course of the current or past military campaigns, the Taliban appeared to have had no difficulty in recruiting stocks of their combat units with such materials. Several Member States, and the Government of Afghanistan explained to the Group that the origin of such materiel is difficult to trace as Afghanistan and the region as a whole overflowing with weapons and ammunition.Thus, some of the weapons and ammunition, used by the Taliban may be illegally supplied to the movement from sources for outside Afghanistan. The group will continue to engage with Member States in the region to further raise awareness on this issue.
60. In addition, some interlocutors pointed out the problems they face Afghanistan in the management of stockpiles of weapons and ammunition belonging to its forces security. Combined with the need to replenish supplies during ongoing combat actions, this entails the danger that a significant number of weapons and ammunition may be missing.Based on the discussions held by the Group with Afghan military officials as well as international partners, it turned out that a significant amount of weapons and ammunition from the Afghan military inventory, in fact, remains unaccounted for. During its recent visit, the Group discussed inventory accounting issues with the relevant Afghan authorities. Group will continue these discussions in order to find out what additional measures can be taken to reduce this risk.
61.The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee urge the Government Afghanistan to explore possible measures that could be taken within the framework of available funds in cooperation with the relevant bodies of the Organization United Nations to improve inventory management | 30 |.
62. In addition to the supply of arms and ammunition, several high-ranking Afghan government officials highlighted the fact that during the current military campaign, Taliban militants are increasingly confiscating items highly specialized, modern equipment such as sniper rifles, laser sights and night vision devices.Several Member States also stressed that militants associated with ISIS in Afghanistan, despite constant military pressure, they were also able to obtain such a specialized equipment. According to Afghan officials as well as international partners of the group, the seized specialized equipment was foreign origin. In the past, the Taliban have always managed to get little the amount of specialized equipment – either through theft, or by capture during clashes.The Group has previously submitted to the Committee the documentation in this regard. However, in recent discussions by the Group, it has become it is obvious that the scale of this problem, judging by the reports, is growing and it is no longer possible explain exclusively by isolated cases of theft or capture on the battlefield. As well in the question of spare parts for improvised explosive devices, documentation on seizures of such funds is essential to identify potential areas of risk.
63. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee be tasked with developing a special project similar to her current documenting project on the seizure of improvised explosive device components by Afghan forces, with the purpose of systematic documentation of seizures, types and brands of special equipment seized from the Taliban, al-Qaeda and militants associated with ISIS in Afghanistan.Member States will then be able to to convey to the Interpol structure through “orange” and “purple” notifications | 31 |.
VI. Work of the Monitoring Team
A. Cooperation with Member States, academia and experts civil society
64. The Monitoring Team works closely with the Government of Afghanistan on on an ongoing basis and looks forward to returning to the frequent trips to the country in 2017. During its visits, the Group also organized workshops for Afghan officials on the sanctions regime resolution 1988 (2011) and related processes.In addition, the Group collected information on the situation in Afghanistan for this report during various country visits and a number of regional and international meetings intelligence services. The group also continued to interact with scientific circles and civil society experts on issues related to the movement The Taliban and the situation in Afghanistan. Since June 2015, during his visits to the country The group collaborates with Afghan analysts and academics. Besides, The group interacts with scientific experts on Afghanistan from the Russian Federation, United States of America and Europe.
B. Cooperation with regional organizations
65. In addition to ongoing cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan, the surveillance continues to interact with Joint Task Force Navy 150 of the Joint Naval Force (JF-150) in Manama and UNODC to identify and analyze the involvement of the Taliban in regulating the flow of drugs from Afghanistan across the Indian Ocean (S / 2015/648, para. 55). Group regularly informs the Committee on the progress of this project.
66. In a similar manner, the Group interacted with the Organization of the collective security in order to identify the participation of the Taliban in organizing the flow of drugs through the so-called “northern route”. Since publication of the sixth report, the Group held a number of meetings with representatives of the Organization in Moscow and New York, and on 1 June 2016, the First Deputy Secretary-General of the Organization informed the Committee of the current anti-drug and anti-terrorism activities of the Organization.The group also sent a similar proposal Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
C. Cooperation with other United Nations bodies
67. The Monitoring Team continues to work closely with the Organization’s Mission United Nations Assistance to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and expresses appreciation for the support that the Panel receives on a regular basis from UNAMA, under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and UNAMA Head Tadamichi Yamamoto (Japan) during her country visits and between such trips.In addition, the Group continues to interact with relevant UNODC experts on production economics drugs in Afghanistan.
D. Cooperation between the Security Council and the International Organization criminal police
68. The Monitoring Team has developed active and regular cooperation with National Central Bureau of Interpol in Kabul. Within this new cooperation, data on threat assessments are regularly exchanged, and the Group the official information on the individuals included in the list is provided.In addition to the National Central Bureau, the Group also works closely with various Interpol working groups and departments at headquarters Organizations in Lyon, France. Through the work of the Interpol Liaison Office in New York and the United Nations staff responsible for providing Support to the monitoring team in its activities, the group also receives an up-to-date information about the individuals and legal entities included in the list from national central bureaus of INTERPOL in a number of member states.Besides, The group participated in United Nations regional training workshops Nations on sanctions organized by Interpol to increase the level of awareness of the relevant stakeholders about the sanctions regime pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011).
E. Facilitating broad discussion
69. The Group would welcome comments on the contents of this report. analytical assessments and proposals; comments can be sent by email mail (1988mt @ un.org).
Footnotes:
1. See also paragraph 40 below. [Text]
2. “Statement of the Governing Body of the Islamic Emirate on the martyrdom of the Emir ul-Muminin Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansur and the election of a new leader “, published on the Taliban website on 13 June 2016. [Text]
3. Listed under the name Mohammad Omar Ghulam Nabi (TAi.004). [Text]
4. The Group provided information on the structure of the Taliban leadership in an appendix to to its sixth report (S / 2015/648).[Text]
5. “Oath of allegiance to family members and commanders of the hero of the Islamic Emirate, martyr Mullah Dadullah Akhunda, published on the Taliban website on 13 August 2016. [Text]
6. On 12 April 2016, the Taliban announced on their website the start of the current summer the offensive campaign “Operation Omari”, named after Mullah Omar. [Text]
7. The situation was repeated, already observed in 2015, when the death was announced Mullah Omar and the appointment of Akhtar Mansur as leader of the Taliban.Neither in that nor otherwise, neither the leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and its affiliated groups have not commented on the leader’s demise Taliban. [Text]
8. According to information from one Member State, one of the key improvised explosive device mediators, Abdel Hamid al-Masli (QDi.320), was killed in Afghanistan during the current period of hostilities. [Text]
9. UNODC and Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socioeconomic Analysis (March 2016), p.3. [Text]
10. See for example UNODC and Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Cultivation and Production (December 2015), p. 12. [Text]
11. According to the opinion of one Member State, the figure of US $ 400 million, in which estimated annual income from the Taliban’s underground drug economy, possibly meets the upper limit, but whatever the income, the Taliban get enough to maintain your combat potential.[Text]
12. This situation has arisen a long time ago; The Panel has already drawn attention to it in paragraph 49 of its sixth report (S / 2015/648). [Text]
13. See, for example, Global Witness, War in the Treasury of the People: Afghanistan Lapis Lazuli and the Battle for Mineral Wealth (June 2016), pp. 20-21. [Text]
14. For details of the agreement, see eg TOLOnews, “Details of peace agreement mapped out “, 20 September 2016. [Text]
15.See, for example, Josh Smith and Mirwais Harooni, “Violent past revisited as Afghanistan initials accord with notorious warlord “, 22 September 2016. See www.reuters.com. [Text]
16. See for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, “Joint Press Release: Meeting of the Quadripartite Coordination Group with Afghanistan Participation, China, United States of America and Pakistan ”, 11 January 2016. [Text]
17. “New statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan regarding the non-participation of delegates in the forthcoming meetings of the Quadripartite Coordination Group “, published on the Taliban website on 5 March 2016.[Text]
18. See S / 2016/629, paragraph 18, which estimates the number of ISIL (Daesh) fighters at less than 3500 people. [Text]
19. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Affairs Refugees, “Update on the Return of Afghan Refugees from Pakistan” (September 5, 2016). See website www.refworld.org/docid/57d0106e4.html. [Text]
20.On 28 May 2016, a statement was posted on the Taliban website Governing Body for the Martyrdom of a Leader and True Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour and the election of a new leader.[Text]
21. INTERPOL, “ANSI / NIST-ITL 1-2007, data format for the interchange of fingerprint, facial and SMT information: INTERPOL implementation (version No. 5.03, April 2011). [Text]
22. For example, a list of registered providers of non-bank financial services in the southwestern part of Kandahar province see website www.fintraca.gov.af/MSPsAndMEs/SouthwestRegion/MSPsInKandahar.aspx. [Text]
23. See www.fintraca.gov.af/UN1988.aspx and www.fintraca.gov.af/UN1267.aspx, respectively. [Text]
24. For translation into Dari, see the website www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/1988_dari.pdf; Pashto translation see Available at www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/1988_dari.pdf. [Text]
25. Afghanistan, Order on Freezing Funds and Assets of Individuals, legal entities and organizations designated in accordance with Council resolutions United Nations Security 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011) and subsequent resolutions adopted by the Security Council of the Organization United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (July 20, 2016).[Text]
26. See paragraph 17 above. [Text]
27. See, for example, Cecilia Jamasmie, “Afghanistan deploys security forces in large illegal mining crackdown “, 8 June 2016. See website www.mining.com/afghanistan-deploys-security-forces-in-large-illegal-mining-crackdown. [Text]
28. See, for example, Pablo Valverde, “Informing reforms – one report at a time” (9 March 2016). See website https://eiti.org/node/4490. [Text]
29. See paragraph 6 above. [Text]
30.The current mandate of the Organization’s Multidimensional Integrated Mission United Nations Stabilization Organization in Mali could serve as a potential the basis for such a project. See resolution 2227 (2015), paras. 14 and 34. [Text]
31. “Orange” notifications are used to exchange information about events, persons, facilities or processes that pose a serious and immediate threat to public safety. “Purple” notifications are used to exchange information about methods of action, objects, devices and methods of hiding.Cm. www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Notices. [Text]
Jerry “Boogie” McCain
Jerry McCain (born 1930, Gadsden, Alabama) is an American blues musician best known for his harmonica playing. He was one of five children of a poor family. His brothers and sisters made music, most notably his brother Walter, who played drums. McCain, on the other hand, became interested in the harmonica, which he played in local bars (and on street corners) when he was little.
McCain became a fan of Little Walter’s work, when he was able to save up money and buy a disc with his records.The boy met with the artist during Little Walter’s tour in Gadsden. Various versions of the story point to Little Walter as McCain’s first producer (Lillian McMurray, Diamond Records, usually sold as Trumpet Records), or as his inspiration to write the first song for Trumpet.
However, the first contract was awarded and he debuted in 1953 on vinyl called “Boogie McCain” on Trumpet, playing with his brother Walter. After recruiting new drummer Christopher Collins, who stayed with him for most of his career, he moved to Excello Records.
Over the years working with Excello (1955-57), he developed his unique harmonica playing style and unusual blues lyrics. The Excello period saw the release of famous songs such as “The Jig’s Up” and “My Next Door Neighbor”. His follow-up recording of “She’s Tough / Steady” on Rex Records was the inspiration for The Fabulous Thunderbirds.
In 1989, after spending some time performing and touring with lesser known bands, McCain was signed to Ichiban Records and released the albums Struttin ‘My Stuff, Blues and Stuff and Love Desperado. “.This led to a revival of public interest in his work and the desire to buy disc with his recordings. While working with Ichiban, he also released one Jericho record, This Stuff Just Kills Me, with Jimmy Vaughn and Johnny Johnson. In 2002, Ichiban released an album titled “American Roots: Blues” featuring McCain.
McCain also released several singles and albums on Columbia, under their Okeh Records label (1962), as well as on the Nashville-based Jewel label (1965-68).The complete collection of his Jewel recordings is available on a compilation CD, and in recent years several of his early recordings have been released on retrospective and compilation CDs, including the album Verose Vintage, Good Stuff. Ichiban Records also released several retrospectives in the 1990s, including “ICh2516 -2: Jerry McCain”. (Their other notable flashback albums are ICH 1514: Gary BB Coleman, ICh2513: Luther ‘Houserocker’ Johnson, and ICH 1515: Trudy Lynn.)
His latest release, This Stuff Just Kills Me, recorded on Cello Records, promised him a more comfortable future, but after the winding down of Cello Records (a division of Warner Bros Records), McCain was once again left without a label.And then he signed a contract with Music Maker, but those who wanted his disc to buy did not decrease.
In 1996, the Etowah Youth Orchestras recognized McCain as the most famous musician from Gadsden. EYO composer Julius Williams wrote a piece for harmonica solo and orchestra for McCain and the Etowah Youth Symphony Orchestra. Concerto for Blues Harmonica and Orchestra premiered in November 1996 at EYO’s Fall Formal Concert at Wallace Hall, Gadsden State Community College campus.McCain performed an accordion solo with EYSO under the direction of Michael R. Gallardo. “Concerto” was subsequently performed at Alice Tully Hall at the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York in the summer of 1997.
Uldor the Cursed – LJ
Here I will add useful links in life and work – so that they are always at handOur
1. Central State Archive of Scientific and Technical Documentation. Funds: https://spbarchives.ru/information_resources/-/archivestore/archive/4
2.Russian National Library (SPb). General alphabetical catalog. Simply put – a scanned array of cards that must be iterated over using the separator names. Using the card, you can order a photocopy of the book in the external service department (corner of Sadovaya and Nevsky, opposite Gostiny Dvor), without registering in the library itself: http://www.nlr.ru/e-case3/sc2.php/web_gak
3. Site on sunken ships – what, where, with coordinates: http://www.wreck.ru/
4. Maps are different: http: // triversti.narod.ru/
5. Maps are even more different – http://only-maps.ru/
(including operational ones, for example SWF 1941-42: http://only-maps.ru/news/karty-boevyx -dejstvij-yugo-zapadnogo-fronta-v-1941-42-gg.html)
6. Topographic maps and plans of Ukraine and the surrounding area of the first half of the twentieth century (Soviet, German, Austrian): http: //maps.vlasenko. net / historical / index.html
The site itself is also interesting, but this is IMHO, the most valuable thing in it …
7. Military History Journal 1990-1997 (you must register): http: // www.twirpx.com/files/historic/periodic/voenno_istoricheskiy_zhurnal/voenno_istoricheskiy_zhurnal_199/
8. Project for digitizing German military documents from Russian archives (the very first link is to the 500th TsAMO fund): http://www.germandocsinrussia.org / ru / nodes / 1-rossiysko-germanskiy-proekt-po-otsifrovke-trofeynyh-kollektsiy
9. The site of the RGA Navy (this is the old design, I like it better): https://old.rgavmf.ru/
10. Istmat – articles and documents, primarily on the history of the USSR from 1917 to 1953: http: // istmat.info /
11. Runivers: old books on history – https://runivers.ru/lib/index_lib.php
12. “International Naval Journal”. Do not be afraid, it is in Russian 🙂 – http://ejournal37.com/en/archive.html?number=2018-06-30-01:27:46&journal=16
13. An attempt to reconstruct German losses in the Second World War according to various sources (Overmans also exists): http://www.poteryww2.narod.ru/
14. Archive of the 51st mine-torpedo aviation regiment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet – http://www.bellabs.ru/51/ index.html
15. Another glove library of non-fiction literature – http://www.k2x2.info/
16. “Library of ancient manuscripts”. In fact – just a warehouse of documents and memoirs up to the twentieth century – http://www.drevlit.ru/
17. Soviet and German military maps + German aerial photography: http: //xn--80aaxgqbdi.xn-- p1ai / publ / 1 / sovetskie_i_nemeckie_karty / 13
18. Gift photo albums of General Wrangel in the archives of the Hoover Institution: https: // digitalcollections.hoover.org/advancedsearch/Objects/archiveType%3AItem%3BcollectionId%3A59073
(one of his collections directly on the Civil War: https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/59088/miscellaneous-russian-civil-war-photographs? ctx = f789aca8-9f69-4db6-a74e-04ba6f6e4d67 & idx = 13)
19. Publishing house “Patriot”, books in free access (including the Book of Memory) – http://books.patriot-izdat.ru/
20. Caspian Military Flotilla Index of articles of the site “Our Baku”: https: // www.ourbaku.com/index.php/%D0%9A%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0 % 92% D0% BE% D0% B5% D0% BD% D0% BD% D0% B0% D1% 8F_% D0% A4% D0% BB% D0% BE% D1% 82% D0% B8% D0% BB % D0% B8% D1% 8F_% D0% A3% D0% BA% D0% B0% D0% B7% D0% B0% D1% 82% D0% B5% D0% BB% D1% 8C_% D1% 81% D1 % 82% D0% B0% D1% 82% D0% B5% D0% B9_% D1% 81% D0% B0% D0% B9% D1% 82% D0% B0_% C2% AB% D0% 9D% D0% B0 % D1% 88_% D0% 91% D0% B0% D0% BA% D1% 83% C2% BB
20. Tsarskoe Selo digital library – http://book-olds.ru
A huge number of books ( ours and not ours), as well as (attention!) – documents on the First World War and the Great Patriotic War.Although the site is mainly devoted to pre-revolutionary Russia. Unfortunately, the materials are posted on third-party hosting, some of the links have long gone rotten …
Not ours
1. Naturally, “Naval Weapons”: http://www.navweaps.com
2. War diaries of the British Admiralty 1939-1945, by fleets: http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-3900Intro.htm
This is part of a large site: http://www.naval-history.net/index.htm – but military diaries there figs you will find
3.WWII Aerial Photos and Maps – http://wwii-photos-maps.com/
4. HyperWar: WWII Anglo-American Documents and Particle Board Publications – http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar /index.html
Updates page – http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/WhatsNew.html
British Official Histories – http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/index.html
Japanese Monographs – http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/
5. Atlas du Génie Maritime: French Drawings of 19th Century Marine Engineering – http: // www.shipmodell.com/index_files/0PLAN_ATLAS1.html
Another resource with the same – https://www.modelships.de/Schiffsplaene/Plaene-Atlas-du-Genie-Maritime.htm
6. Australian War Memorial. Library – https://www.awm.gov.au/advanced-search?library=true
7. Project “Gutenberg”: scanned (and recognized) old books, primarily non-fiction – http: / /www.gutenberg.org/
8. Another similar resource is https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/mb?colltype=all
9.The University of Texas Library Map Collection – http://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/
10. David Rumsey Map Collection – https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/browseByCategory
11 French Aircraft Carrier Drawings – http://3dhistory.de/wordpress/warship-drawings-warship-blue-prints-warship-plans/french-aircraft-carrier-drawingsplan-sets/
12. World War II day after day. Events and photos – http://worldwartwodaily.filminspector.com/
13. US Civil War Navy – https: // sites.google.com/site/290foundation/civil-war-navies
14. French site “Trehdechniki”, archive – https://troisponts.net/index/
15. A page dedicated to the Pacific War of 1879-1884. – http://gdp1879.blogspot.com/search/label/mar%C3%ADtima
16. Australian shipping 1788-1968: list of ships that arrived in Australia – http://www.blaxland.com/ozships /
17. BnF – Gallica. Online library of the National Library of France, section of historical literature – https: // gallica.bnf.fr/html/und/histoire/accueil
18 – New, and again from the French! Plans and drawings from the archives of the shipyards of Nantes: La bibliothèque numérique de la Maison des Hommes et des techniques (MHT) et de l’Association histoire de la construction navale à Nantes (AHCNN) – http://my.yoolib.com/ mht / collection /? esp = 0
19. Catalog of German documents from NARA – http://www.maparchive.ru/index.php/germanyarchive.html
(specifically the corpus funds – http: //www.maparchive …ru / index.php / corps.html)
UPD NEW!
20. Catalog of images of the US National Archives. Simply put, the original drawings and some photos
Records of the Bureau of Ships, 1940-1966: https://catalog.archives.gov/search?q=*:*&f.ancestorNaIds=348&sort=naIdSort%20asc
Why – in the same catalog – Alphabetical Series of Ship Engineering Drawings, 1919-1940: https://catalog.archives.gov/search?q=*:*&f.ancestorNaIds=559623&sort=naIdSort%20asc
21.British Navy Infantry Transport: http://www.britisharmedforces.org/pages/nat_troopships.htm
22. Australian Army Journal Archive Issues: https://web.archive.org/web/20130401141929/http://army .gov.au / Our-future / DARA / Our-publications / Australian-Army-Journal / Past-issues
(magazine in strange .ashx format, so read it online …)
23. US Navy Cruise Books – https://www.navysite.de/cruisebooks/index.html (NEW-NEW!)
Unofficial limited editions of the stories of the ship’s voyages.Many photos in good resolution, but spoiled by the watermarks of the site owner – he also wants to eat and he buys pdfs …
24. Digital Library of the University of Heidelberg: https://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/ helios / Welcome.html
Illustrated editions of the 17th-18th centuries. Maps – up to the 19th century
25. Reports of the U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan (1945-1946) – https://pacificwararchive.wordpress.com/2018/04/21/reports-of-the-us-naval-technical-mission-to-japan-1945-1946/
Links to scanned microfilms translated into.pdf
26. Yes, of course: “Spring Styles” – http://www.shipscribe.com/styles/S-511/albums/S511.htm
Here are volumes one and three. The fourth post-war volume is under the stamp (as, for example, the fund of the NTK Navy in the TsVMA). The third volume seems to be irretrievably profiled by the valiant NARA
27. Collection of geographical and topographic maps of the Pacific region from the library of the Australian National University – https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/107367
Very many top …maps from the Second World War and immediately after. Careful, there are even 500 meters!
28. Catalog for collection items held by the National Library of Australia – https://catalogue.nla.gov.au
In particular, there are a lot of topographic maps of the South Pacific region, in including wartime. Very good resolution, easy to download.
29. State Archives of Singapore. Section of maps and plans – https: // www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/maps_building_plans
Very crooked navigation, very greedy – they want money for everything (unlike the Australians), and they lie that this is like “private property”. But if you dig around, there are even British plans to build a naval base in the 1930s, with battery locations and shelling sectors …
30. Die Schnellboot-Seite. Section “S-Boote in der Kriegsmarine 1935-1945” with a detailed chronicle of the actions of German torpedo boats in all theaters of war – http: // s-boot.net / sboote-kriegsmarine-kriegsschpl.html
31. World War II Operational Documents (mostly maps) – https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8
33. Australia and War … Peter Dunn’s website. A lot of interesting, albeit scattered information – https://www.ozatwar.com
34. Corregidor: American coastal artillery of Manila Bay – https://corregidor.