Kali Hartshorn: Rising Star in Women’s Lacrosse Coaching

Who is Kali Hartshorn. How did she transition from player to coach. What impact has she made on Binghamton University’s lacrosse program. What are her notable achievements as a player and coach.

From Player to Coach: Kali Hartshorn’s Lacrosse Journey

Kali Hartshorn’s transition from a decorated player to an assistant coach in women’s lacrosse exemplifies the natural progression of exceptional athletes into mentorship roles. After an illustrious career at the University of Maryland, Hartshorn joined the coaching staff at Binghamton University in the fall of 2020, bringing with her a wealth of experience and a fresh perspective to the program.

During her time as a player at Maryland, Hartshorn demonstrated exceptional skills that would later translate into her coaching abilities:

• Amassed 201 career points, including 154 goals
• Ranked second in program history with 421 career draw controls
• Named Inside Lacrosse Preseason All-American
• Received second-team All-American honors in 2019
• Earned All-Big Ten and IWLCA First-Team All-Region recognition
• Voted Big Ten Freshman of the Year in 2017

These accomplishments laid a solid foundation for Hartshorn’s coaching career, providing her with invaluable insights into high-level competition and the nuances of the game.

Binghamton’s Lacrosse Revolution: Hartshorn’s Coaching Impact

Since joining Binghamton University’s coaching staff, Kali Hartshorn has been instrumental in elevating the women’s lacrosse program to new heights. Her influence has been particularly evident in the team’s remarkable achievements during the 2023 season:

• First playoff victory in the America East semifinals (12-10 against Vermont)
• Inaugural America East Championship game appearance
• Best conference record (5-1) in program history
• Highest tournament seed (#2) ever achieved
• Most overall wins (11) in a single season
• Longest winning streak (7 consecutive games)

These milestones underscore the positive impact Hartshorn has had on the team’s performance and competitiveness within the conference.

Breaking New Ground: Historic Victories and Records

Under Hartshorn’s guidance, the Binghamton Bearcats have achieved several groundbreaking victories that have put the program on the map:

• First-ever win against an ACC opponent (11-5 victory over Pittsburgh on February 16)
• First victory against an Ivy League opponent (defeated Cornell in Ithaca on March 15)

These wins demonstrate the program’s growth and ability to compete against traditionally strong lacrosse schools, a testament to Hartshorn’s coaching acumen and the team’s improved performance.

Individual Honors and Team Records: A Testament to Hartshorn’s Coaching

The 2023 season saw an unprecedented number of individual accolades for Binghamton players, reflecting Hartshorn’s ability to develop talent and maximize player potential:

• Emily Manning earned Goalkeeper of the Year honors
• Record eight Bearcats received all-conference honors (three first-team, five second-team)
• Seven America East Player of the Week Awards (two offensive, five defensive)

Additionally, several team and individual records were set or broken during the season:

• Most assists in a single game (11 vs. Colgate)
• Highest number of draw controls (22 vs. UMBC)
• Perfect clear percentage (22-22 vs. UNH)
• Most goals in a period (eight vs. Marist)
• Kenna Newman set a new program record with seven assists in a single game
• Abigail Carroll established a new BU single-season record with 19 free position goals
• Hayley Weltner became the first Binghamton player to surpass 100 draw controls in a season (102)

These achievements highlight the comprehensive improvement of the team under Hartshorn’s tutelage, spanning various aspects of the game from scoring and assists to draw controls and defensive play.

Hartshorn’s Coaching Philosophy: Innovation and Competitiveness

Kali Hartshorn’s approach to coaching is characterized by innovation, competitiveness, and a focus on both mental and physical aspects of the game. Head Coach Stephanie Allen’s comments on Hartshorn provide insight into her coaching style:

“Kali has a coaching approach that will work well with our team as she is young, innovative and will push our players in terms of attitude and mindset just as much as on-field play. Her expertise in the draw area, as well as, the offensive end will help bring fresh ideas and strategies to these units.”

This multifaceted approach to coaching has evidently contributed to the team’s success and individual player development.

Specialized Skills and Strategic Focus

Hartshorn’s playing experience has translated into specialized coaching expertise in key areas of the game:

• Draw control techniques and strategies
• Offensive tactics and execution
• Player mentality and competitive mindset

By focusing on these crucial aspects, Hartshorn has helped elevate Binghamton’s performance in critical game situations and fostered a winning culture within the program.

The Future of Binghamton Women’s Lacrosse Under Hartshorn’s Guidance

Given the remarkable progress made in the 2023 season, the future looks bright for Binghamton’s women’s lacrosse program with Kali Hartshorn on the coaching staff. The team’s first-ever appearance in the America East Championship game signals a new era of competitiveness and success.

Areas of potential future growth and development include:

• Consistent performance against top-tier opponents
• Further refinement of offensive and defensive strategies
• Continued player development and recruitment of talented athletes
• Expansion of the program’s national profile and recognition

With Hartshorn’s playing pedigree and growing coaching experience, Binghamton is well-positioned to build on its recent successes and establish itself as a formidable force in collegiate women’s lacrosse.

The Impact of Collegiate Success on Coaching Effectiveness

Kali Hartshorn’s transition from a highly successful collegiate player to an effective coach raises interesting questions about the correlation between playing experience and coaching ability. Does a decorated playing career necessarily translate to coaching success?

While not all great players become great coaches, Hartshorn’s case suggests that high-level playing experience can indeed be a valuable asset in coaching. Her intimate understanding of the game, gained through years of competitive play at the highest collegiate level, likely contributes to her ability to develop strategies, identify talent, and relate to players’ experiences and challenges.

Factors that may contribute to Hartshorn’s coaching effectiveness include:

• Deep understanding of game dynamics and strategies
• Recent experience with modern playing styles and techniques
• Ability to demonstrate skills and provide practical advice
• Credibility among players due to her accomplished career
• Fresh perspective on training methods and team management

However, it’s important to note that coaching also requires unique skills beyond playing ability, such as communication, leadership, and the ability to motivate and develop others. Hartshorn’s success suggests she has been able to effectively combine her playing experience with these essential coaching qualities.

Challenges and Opportunities in Women’s Collegiate Lacrosse

As a young coach in women’s collegiate lacrosse, Kali Hartshorn is well-positioned to address and capitalize on the evolving landscape of the sport. What are some of the current challenges and opportunities facing women’s lacrosse programs?

Challenges in women’s collegiate lacrosse include:

• Increasing competition for top recruits
• Balancing athletic and academic demands for student-athletes
• Adapting to rule changes and evolving gameplay strategies
• Securing funding and resources for program development
• Navigating the impact of Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) regulations

Opportunities in the sport encompass:

• Growing national interest and media coverage of women’s lacrosse
• Expansion of youth lacrosse programs, creating a larger talent pool
• Advancements in training technologies and analytics
• Increased focus on diversity and inclusion in collegiate sports
• Potential for professional leagues and post-collegiate playing opportunities

Hartshorn’s recent playing experience and coaching innovation position her well to navigate these challenges and capitalize on emerging opportunities in the sport.

The Role of Mentorship in Coaching Development

As a young coach, Kali Hartshorn likely benefits from mentorship within the coaching staff at Binghamton University. How does mentorship contribute to the development of effective coaches in collegiate sports?

Mentorship in coaching can provide numerous benefits:

• Guidance on program management and administrative responsibilities
• Sharing of best practices in training and game strategy
• Advice on handling player relationships and team dynamics
• Insights into recruiting processes and talent evaluation
• Support in navigating career advancement opportunities

For Hartshorn, working alongside experienced coaches like Head Coach Stephanie Allen likely provides valuable learning opportunities that complement her playing experience, helping her develop a well-rounded coaching skill set.

The Significance of Diversity in Coaching Staff Composition

Kali Hartshorn’s addition to the Binghamton coaching staff brings diversity in terms of age and recent playing experience. How does diversity within coaching staffs benefit collegiate sports programs?

Diverse coaching staffs can enhance team performance and player development through:

• Varied perspectives on game strategy and player management
• Different communication styles that resonate with a wider range of athletes
• Representation that can inspire and relate to diverse player backgrounds
• Complementary skill sets that cover various aspects of program management
• Innovation stemming from different experiences and approaches to the game

Hartshorn’s presence on the staff likely brings a fresh outlook that complements the experience of other coaches, creating a dynamic and effective coaching environment.

The Future of Coaching in Women’s Lacrosse

As the sport of women’s lacrosse continues to grow and evolve, what might the future hold for coaching in this field? Kali Hartshorn represents a new generation of coaches who are bridging the gap between recent high-level play and coaching roles.

Potential trends in women’s lacrosse coaching may include:

• Increased emphasis on data analytics and technology in game planning
• Greater focus on player mental health and holistic development
• Expansion of specialized coaching roles (e.g., draw control specialists)
• Integration of cross-sport training techniques for improved athleticism
• Enhanced use of video analysis and virtual coaching tools

Coaches like Hartshorn, who combine recent playing experience with innovative approaches, may be at the forefront of implementing these advancements in collegiate programs.

Kali Hartshorn – Assistant Women’s Lacrosse Coach – Staff Directory

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Kali Hartshorn joined the coaching staff in the fall of 2020 following a decorated playing career at the University of Maryland.

In 2023, Hartshorn helped lead Binghamton to their first playoff victory in the America East semifinals against Vermont, 12-10. The Bearcats’ record-breaking season included its first-ever America East Championship game appearance, best conference record (5-1),  tournament seed (#2), most overall wins (11) and most consecutive wins (7) … it also was filled with individual honors with Emily Manning earning Goalkeeper of the Year honors, and a record eight Bearcats earning all-conference honors (three first-team, five second team). Binghamton won seven America East Player of the Week Awards in 2023 (two offensive, five defensive), the most in any season in team history. On February 16, Binghamton defeated Pittsburgh, 11-5. This was the first ever win against an ACC opponent in team history. On March 15, Binghamton defeated Cornell in Ithaca, which was the first time the Bearcats had beaten any Ivy League opponent. Binghamton set several team records including assists in a single-game (11 vs. Colgate), draw controls (22 vs. UMBC), clear percentage (22-22 vs. UNH), most goals in a period (eight vs. Marist). Kenna Newman set a new program record with seven assists in the win against Bryant on April 8, breaking her own single-game record of six, which came against Colgate on March 8. Abigail Carroll set a new BU single-season record with 19 free position goals and 1.19 free position goals per game. Hayley Weltner became the first Binghamton player to have over 100 draw controls in a season (102). 

Hartshorn helped guide the Bearcats made an appearance in the America East Semifinals.

At Maryland, Hartshorn registered 201 career points, including 154 goals. She was also second in program history with 421 career draw controls. 

Prior to COVID-19 shutting down the season in 2020, Hartshorn was an Inside Lacrosse Preseason All-American following a second-team All-American honor received in 2019. That season, she was an All-Big Ten and IWLCA First-Team All-Region recipient.  

Added to her list of accomplishments, Hartshorn was voted Big Ten Freshman of the Year in 2017.

The Allentown, N.J. native will look to carry her collegiate success to the coaching side, beginning in the 2021 season.

Head Coach Stephanie Allen on Hartshorn: “We are thrilled to welcome Kali to the Bearcat family. We are very eager for the new things she can bring to our program through her experiences at Maryland and the competitive environment in which she played.  Kali has a coaching approach that will work well with our team as she is young, innovative and will push our players in terms of attitude and mindset just as much as on-field play. Her expertise in the draw area, as well as, the offensive end will help bring fresh ideas and strategies to these units.” 

Hartshorn resides in Binghamton.

Kali Hartshorn – Women’s Lacrosse

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Biography

CAREER HONORS

• Second all-time in Maryland history with 421 draw controls 

• 2020 Tewaaraton Watch List

• 2020 Inside Lacrosse Preseason All-American

• 2020 Big Ten Player to Watch

• 2019 Second Team All-American

• 2019 Tewaaraton Nominee

• 2019 All-Big Ten

• 2019 IWLCA First Team All-Region 

• 2x IWLCA Second Team All-Region (2017, 2018)

• 2x Inside Lacrosse Media Honorable Mention All-American (2017, 2018)

• 2018 All-Big Ten Tournament Team

• 2017 Big Ten Freshman of the Year

• 2017 ILWomen All-Rookie Team

• 2x Big Ten Offensive Player of the Week (2/18/19, 3/26/19)

• 5x Big Ten Freshman of the Week (4/25/17, 4/18/17, 4/11/17, 3/28/17, 3/14/17) 

HARTSHORN IN THE NEWS

• Maryland’s Hartshorn on Pace to Break Cummings’ Career Draw Control Mark (US Lacrosse Magazine, May 23, 2018)

As a Senior (2020): Start all six games on attack . .. Led Maryland with 20 points and 10 assists while standing third with 10 goals … Also led Maryland’s effort in the draw circle, securing 33 draw controls … Tallied five points (3G, 2A), a career-high three groundballs and four draw controls in win over Navy (3/4) … Secured the second highest total of her career with 14 draw controls vs. Florida (2/14) to help Maryland win the draw battle 21-10, while also scoring three goals and assisting on another … Tied career high with seven points in season opener at George Mason with four goals and three assists. 

As a Junior (2019): Started at all 23 games on attack … Led Maryland’s effort in the circle, recording 137 draw controls, the fourth most ever in a single-season, only trailing her mark from 2018 and Taylor Cummings’ from 2016 and 2015 … Scored 48 goals, posted 19 assists, 11 groundballs and eight caused turnovers … Scored two goals and added an assist in the second half of the National Semifinal vs. Northwestern (5/24) … Tied career high with three assists in National Quarterfinal vs. Denver (5/18) … Posted four goals and eight draw controls vs. Johns Hopkins (4/27) … Won a season-high 12 draw controls at Georgetown (4/17) … Notched three points (two goals, one assist) and had nine draw controls at Northwestern (4/11) … Led the game with seven draw controls vs. Michigan (4/6) … Won seven draws and had a goal and assist at Rutgers (3/30) … Scored four goals, had five pooints and won 11 draw controls vs. Princeton (3/27) … Big Ten Offensive Player of the Week (3/26) … Matched season high with six points on three goals and a career-best three assists at James Madison (3/24) … Scored three goals, had an assist, won 11 draw controls and caused a career-high two caused turnovers at Penn State (3/21) … Recorded five first half goals (career-high) and added an assist vs. Ohio State (3/16) … Scored game winning goal in overtime on a free position assist from Hannah Warther against Syracuse (3/9) while also winning nine draw controls . .. Scored game tying goal on behind the back shot to send the game to overtime vs. North Carolina (2/24), where Maryland won the game … Big Ten Offensive Player of the Week (2/19) … Scored a game-best four goals and tallied nine draw controls at Florida (2/14) … Opened season with a hat trick and assist vs. George Mason (2/9). 

As a Sophomore (2018): Played in 21 of the teams 22 games, starting in 20 … had a sensational season in the circle, recording 139 draw controls, the third-most in a single-season in Maryland history … ranked fourth in points (44) and goals (38) … matched a season-high with five points on four goals and one assist in the NCAA Semifinals against Boston College (5/25) … recorded a hat-trick and 10 draw controls in NCAA Quarterfinals vs. Navy (5/19) … set career-best and best mark in the Big Ten in 2018 with 16 draw controls, while also adding three goals and one assist in the Big Ten Championship against Penn State (5/6) … won 12 draw controls and scored four times at Ohio State (4/15) . .. notched a hat-trick, nine draws and two groundballs against Rutgers (4/6) … led the Terps with five points (4G, 1A) in win over Virginia (4/4) … totaled five points (4G, 1A) and 10 draw controls against Georgetown (3/28) … filled up stat-sheet with a hat-trick, seven draw controls, and one groundball and caused turnover at Syracuse (3/11) … posted a then career-best 11 draws at North Carolina (2/24). 

As a Freshman (2017): Started all 23 games on attack and in the draw circle … ranked second on the team with 58 goals … led the Terps with 112 draws, which ranks fifth in the Maryland single-season record books … five-time Big Ten Freshman of the Week (3/14, 3/28, 4/11, 4/18, 4/25) … scored four goals and had nine draws vs. Penn State (5/26) … notched five goals, one assist and five draws vs. Princeton (4/12) … had seven points (6G, 1A) at Rutgers (4/8) … notched four points vs. JMU (3/25) … scored a hat trick vs. Penn (3/22) … posted four goals, one assist and eight draws vs. Syracuse (3/11) … tallied four points (3G, 1A) and six draws vs. Boston College (3/8) … scored twice and added five draws vs. UNC (2/25) … grabbed nine draw controls and scored once at Georgetown (2/18).

Before Maryland: 2016 Under Armour All-American … 2016 US Lacrosse All-American First Team All-Area and All-CVC in 2014, ’15, ’16 … ranked No. 29 freshman by Inside Lacrosse … team leader in goals, assists and points as a senior … four-year letterwinner in lacrosse, basketball and soccer … named Offensive Player of the Year in 2015 … also All-CVC and All-Area in basketball and soccer … played club for Ultimate NJ … competed in the national championship with U15 Elite Team.

Personal: Daughter of Kyle and Tracey Hartshorn … has one sister, Marin who is a sophomore at Rutgers … favorite pregame meal is steak and a potato … sports hero is Shaun White … majoring in kinesiology.

HARTSHORN CAREER HIGHS

Goals: 6 vs. Rutgers (4/8/17)

Assists: 3 (3x), last at George Mason (2/8/20)

Points: 7 (2x), last at George Mason (2/8/20)

Ground balls: 3 vs. Navy (3/4/20)

Draw controls: 16 vs. Penn State (5/6/18)

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© 2023 University of Maryland

Ontological argument

Ontological argument

A brief overview of modern versions

The Ontological Argument (OA) is without a doubt the most popular argument for the existence of God. With all the variety of other evidence, OA leads by a wide margin. This article is devoted to the analysis of evidence of this type.

I. Pre-analytical background

The argument got its name thanks to Immanuel Kant, who subjected it to powerful criticism [1.]. Historically, the first, “real” version of the OA is considered to be the arguments set forth in chapters II and III (and sometimes only II or only III) of Anselm of Canterbury’s Proslogion.

The OA has always had strong supporters. Thus, Duns Scotus, Rene Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel not only recognized the power of OA, but also offered their own versions of this argument. Until a certain moment, discussions of OA (again revived after a long break in the early 1930s) covered mainly the proof from the second chapter of the Proslogion and were conducted without any attempts at formalization [2.]. Perhaps the only exception is the ontological proof of Kurt Gödel, published in 1931

Here, in pre-analytical prehistory, we leave all variants of objections about the dubiousness of certain assumptions that are required to prove the existence (in particular, the necessary existence) of God, since this is a problem inherent in the whole corpus of proofs of this kind. Here we leave the problems that are characteristic of all proofs of precisely the ontological kind and are connected with the problem of the exact definition of the term “God”. Obviously, the definition of this term will directly depend on how the proof itself will be built. Both problems mentioned are extremely interesting; to overcome them, a lot of various thought experiments have been invented, but they are not within the scope of our interests in this article. We will talk about the formal-ontological side of the issue, digressing as far as possible from the purely metaphysical aspects of the matter.

II. Analytic prehistory

Thanks to Norman Malcolm [Malcolm 1960], since 1960 the discussion of the ontological argument has taken a new direction: as the most promising evidence has been considered not from the second, but from the third chapter of the Proslogion. As a rule, modern analytic philosophers, speaking of the ontological argument, have in mind precisely this:

“So, without a doubt, something greater than which cannot be imagined [ aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit ], exists both in the mind and in reality. And, of course, it exists so truly that it cannot be imagined as non-existent. For one can conceive that there is something which cannot be conceived as non-existent; and it is greater than what can be imagined as non-existent. Therefore, if that which cannot be imagined greater can be imagined as non-existent, then that which cannot be imagined greater is not that which cannot be imagined greater; contradiction. This means that something greater than which cannot be conceived exists so genuinely that it is impossible to conceive of it as non-existent. And it is You, O Lord our God” [Anselm 1995, 102–103].
It is this reasoning that has been trying to be formalized since 1961. The first version of the formalization, due to Charles Hartshorne [Hartshorne 1961], is not particularly elegant (here “ P ” means “perfection”, and boxing is the standard designation of necessity) [3.]:

1.	∃xP(x) ⊃ □∃xP(x)	Df
2.	¬□∃xP(x) ⊃ □¬□∃xP(x)	Special case of the characteristic axiom S5: ◊А ⊃ □◊А
3.	□¬□∃xP(x) ⊃ □¬∃x(x)	modal contraposition to 1
4.	□∃xP(x) ∨ □¬∃x P (x)	law excl. third 2, 3
5.	¬□¬∃xP(x)	add.
6.	□∃xP(x)	modus tollendoponens 4, 5

The reasoning is deciphered, according to Hartshorne, as follows:

1. If perfection exists, it exists with necessity.

2. If perfection does not necessarily exist, then this very fact necessarily exists.

3. If the unnecessary existence of perfection is necessary, then its nonexistence is necessary.

4. However, perfection either necessarily exists or necessarily does not exist.

5. There is no need for perfection not to exist.

6. Thus, perfection exists by necessity.

Frankly speaking, reasoning is more like a sophistical set of tricks than a proof in the strict sense of the word. At the same time, the weakest point is the assumption (5) – that there is no need for the non-existence of God. We might as well say that in his there is no need for : ¬□∃xP(x). And then modus tollendo-ponens from (4) and (5) would immediately conclude that God necessarily does not exist.

Even if we admit that Hartshorne’s reasoning is not a proof in the strict sense and the attempt at formalization is just an attempt, and also clarify that Hartshorne, apparently, had no idea about Lewis systems (or did not seek to use them), – even then, all these reservations will not cancel the subsequent reception of Hartshorne’s ideas as a formalization of the argument in the S5 system (see, for example, [Friedman 1980]).

Thus, Robert Kane [Kane 1984] proposed to consider the reconstruction of this proof “lightened” by Hartshorne himself and formalized by Kane (where “G” is an abbreviation for the statement “a perfect object exists”):

Such an interpretation allows Kane to show that the proof goes not only in the Lewis modal system S5, but also in the weaker system B. However, none of the interpretations is still suitable for weaker Lewis modal systems (in particular, for S4 ).

In addition, an obvious claim was made to Hartshorne’s proof that it is irrelevant to Anselm’s proof: the thing is that Hartshorne’s formalization uses only the modality de dicto , while Anselm’s only uses the modality de re (more on this below).

III. Analytical history

In the 1970s, analytic philosophers got a new effective tool for analyzing modal contexts – the semantics of possible worlds. It became obvious that the greatest success in the formalization of OA can be achieved with its help.

In 1974, Alvin Plantinga [Plantinga 1974] first attempted to formulate the modal ontological argument in terms of the semantics of possible worlds. The wording was as follows:

1.	There is a possible world in which maximum greatness takes place.	add.
2.	It is necessary that an object is maximally great only if it has the maximum perfection in each world.	Df
3.	It is necessary that an object has maximum perfection in each world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence and moral integrity in each world.	Df
4.	The statement “there is no omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect object” is impossible in at least one possible world.	according to 1
5.	What is impossible in one world is impossible in every world.
6.	The statement “there is no omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect object” is impossible in every world.	according to 4, 5
7.	There is an object that has omnipotence, omniscience and moral impeccability in every possible world, including the actual one.	according to 6

A lot of copies were broken about this, frankly speaking, not quite formalized proof. He has both serious defenders (for example, Michael Tooley, Joel I. Friedman and Edward Wierenga) and formidable opponents (Pavel Tichy, Graham Oppy, Patrick Grim, etc.). This proof is very popular among, so to speak, ordinary believers, many of whom believe that, after Plantinga’s work, the existence of God should not be in any doubt.

Nevertheless, Plantinga’s reasoning arbitrarily combines statements about statements and about objects in a possible world (worlds), which is not quite correct, since statements and objects in the world are entities of a different order. By considering these entities as beings of the same order, the proof mixes the modalities de re (that is, those related to things) and de dicto (related to the sentences of the language). Plantinga, however, claims that he simply does not see the difference between these types of modality, since both (in his opinion) are extremely vague and unclear, but this statement itself requires justification. As a simple statement of fact, it looks somewhat controversial. For a more detailed analysis of Plantinga’s argument, see [Gorbatova 2012].

In 1979, another American philosopher, Joel Friedman [Friedman 1979], proposed another variant of the ontological argument. He himself called it “mystical”. Like many other authors, Friedman sought to offer a proof in which (a) existence would not be a real predicate; b) proper names and definite descriptions would be used correctly; c) there would be no errors in the interpretation of modalities.

The argument has two versions. The first one is simplified and unformalized:

1.	God is the most incomprehensible being.	mystic’s Df
2.	It is necessary that something is incomprehensible.	add.
3.	It is necessary that there is a maximally incomprehensible being.	of 1, 2
4.	God necessarily exists.	according to 3

The following definition of “being incomprehensible” is given:

Df:
x is incomprehensible if and only if x is indeterminable by first-order logic and incomprehensible, and there are no examples or manifestations (or perhaps good analogues) x that are definable or perceptible.

For each point of the proof, the author offers explanations why this argument should be considered not only valid (valid), but also convincing (sound). On the one hand, it’s not bad that Friedman is so concerned about the persuasive power of his argument that he considers it necessary to explain each point in detail: it seems quite reasonable to want to be not only (and sometimes not so much) logically correct, but also convincing, understandable and not cause unnecessary questions. On the other hand, it looks a little strange: usually they try to achieve persuasiveness through simple and meaningfully clear premises that would not require explanation for several pages. Although, perhaps, my surprise has no serious grounds: in the end, Friedman’s propaedeutic excitement can be tried to justify by saying that before the method of self-evident premises has not yet made anyone “happy”.

The second, formalized version of the argument impresses with its monumentality. We will not consider it in detail here. Friedman himself considers it a detailed version of the simplified version, but a cursory glance raises the suspicion that it raises even more questions than the first. As for the formalization, it clearly shows that the author is working with a quantified modal logic with predicates of equality and existence. In other words, we have a second-order modal logic. The powerful set of predicates adopted by Friedman imposes serious ontological obligations on the realm of existence. I repeat, however, that a detailed analysis of a large formalized proof does not fit into the goals and objectives of this review, in its essence, article.

IV. Analytical (scholastic) present

After a rather turbulent stage of numerous attempts to formalize OA, by the end of the 80s of the twentieth century, a period began that can be called New Scholasticism: sophisticated definitions and new terms were used, making it possible to formulate well famous argument.

Thus, in 1988, Stephen Makin [Makin 1988] proposed his own version of OA, which was supposed to overcome the main objections to the possibility of a modal version of the ontological proof. Makin’s line of reasoning is as follows:

Principle A
For any pair of concepts A and B it is true that if A is an exemplifying concept, and no, then (ceteris paribus) and more b 0022 B respectively).

The argument is very elegant, because although it is a clear and direct successor to Anselm’s own proof, it at the same time avoids the main claims made against the classical version and its subsequent reincarnations. Thus, Makin’s argument does not require either explicit or even implicit recognition of existence as a real predicate, and is also insensitive to the problem of indistinguishing modalities.0021 de re and de dicto . Nevertheless, alas, in addition to unconditional merits, this argument also has shortcomings, which, however, are not so obvious and rude as to decisively refuse this version of the proof to be consistent.

Makin’s proof aroused considerable interest among analytic theologians, and he received his dose of criticism (I could not find Makin’s supporters). Not all criticism hits exactly the target, although very venerable authors acted as opponents (see, for example, [McGrarth 1988] and [Oppy 1991]). Personally, I think (for more details see [Gorbatova 2015]) that the weakest point of the proof is the recognition of the non-emptiness of the class of necessarily exemplifying concepts on the grounds that the class of necessarily non-exemplifying concepts is non-empty, and the modalities are mutually expressible.

In 1997, Stephen Davis [Davis 2016] in Chapter 8 of his book God, Reason, and Theistic Evidence, attempted to show the validity and persuasiveness of Anselm’s argument based on his notions of alethic modalities.

He introduces a classification of things on two grounds, dividing them into existing and non-existent and necessary, possible and accidental. Having introduced the classification, Davies tests it for “thinkability”: for each category, he asks whether we can think of a thing of this kind, and answers it, relying solely on common sense. From his point of view, we get a positive answer to the question regarding 4 out of 6 categories: impossible existing things and necessary non-existent things are, in his opinion, unthinkable (in fact, we have one and the same category if we rely on standard mutual expressibility modal operators: ¬◊А ≡ □¬А). Thus, two terms of division are discarded by virtue of their emptiness.

As part of the updated classification, Davis proposes to find a place for God – CBMS – “the greatest conceivable being.” Referring to what has already been proved by Anselm, Davis does not find it possible to classify CBMS as randomly existing or randomly non-existent objects, since both are incompatible with the idea of ​​the greatest being itself. The intrigue reaches its climax. Who is God after all: an impossible non-existent or a necessary existing object? Davis refers to the impossible non-existent things, the concepts of which are logically contradictory or incoherent. From his point of view, the concept of the greatest conceivable being is neither contradictory nor incoherent. Thus, the only category in which God can be placed is necessary existing things.

Davies does not hide the fact that this proof is not conclusive, and it still seems very suspicious to me, but within the framework of this article, I do not have the opportunity to reveal my doubts in more detail.

In turn, in 2010, Gareth Matthews and Lynn Baker [Matthews & Baker 2010] proposed to simplify Anselm’s argument so that its natural rigor and elegance come through more clearly. To do this, they introduced a distinction between direct (unmediated) and mediated (mediated) causal power: thus, objects that exist in reality have an immediate causal power, while objects that do not exist in reality (for example, Pegasus or Sherlock Holmes) – only mediated. Accordingly, the question of the existence of God must be resolved by answering the question of what kind of causal power he has: indirect or direct.

1.	God is that more than which cannot be conceived.	Df
2.	Only objects that actually exist have immediate causal power.	no Df
3.	Any object with immediate causal power, is greater than of any object that does not have this power.
4.	God is an object in reality.

“The Fool” against the “double Anselm” (represented by Baker and Matthews) was supported by the most famous expert on all conceivable versions of the ontological argument – Graham Oppy (see his monograph, entirely devoted to modern forms of the ontological argument, [Oppy 1995]). In a series of short articles, Oppie on the one hand, and Baker and Matthews on the other, acted out a fast-paced dialogue between the Fool and Anselm. The fool (Oppy) sought to show that, with the proposed interpretation of the concepts, there is not so much difference between Pegasus and God. And if God has immediate causal power, it is only in the same sense that Pegasus can fly (flying refers to immediate causal powers): we say, of course, that Pegasus is a horse with wings that can fly, but not we mean neither its existence, nor the fact that this fictional object really has any abilities.

Matthews and Baker insist that an object that has immediate causal power is obviously “greater” than an object that does not. They do not present any new essential arguments, while Oppi does, offering an additional, quite in the spirit of the new scholasticism, division of non-existent objects into those that have obviously mediated and non-obviously mediated causal power. He naturally refers to God as an object of the latter kind: that is, it only seems to us that he has a direct causal power.

2007–09 Elena Grigorievna Dragalina-Chernaya published a series of articles (see, for example, [Dragalina-Chernaya 2007, 2009, 2011]) devoted to one of the most beautiful (in my opinion) interpretations of Anselm’s ontological argument. Elena Grigorievna proposes to evaluate Anselm’s proof not as logical, but as performative, that is, one that is characterized by “a transition not from one true statement to another, but from one justified action to another, thus obtaining its validity” [Dragalina-Chernaya 2011, 55].

The justifying action in the case of the ontological argument is the reference to “that which cannot be conceived greater than”. The reference to such an unusual object is a special reflexive act in which “the cognizing intellect becomes aware of itself as a cognizer”, being addressed to two levels at once: the objective level of “the thing in question”, and the meta-level of “thought about this thing”. This idea seems to me incredibly elegant and successful, but it obviously stands out from a number of purely logical interpretations of the ontological argument.

V. Conclusion

Here I have to stop, because I still need to stop somewhere. Not all modern versions of the ontological argument have been mentioned in this article. Most of the objections and criticisms remained behind the scenes (of course, it is much easier to criticize, and therefore there is an abundance of critical literature on almost every evidence).

Obviously, everything is not so simple with the ontological proof: if it were hopeless, more and more new philosophers would not approach it with new and new forces and methods. Our small and brief review, however, helps to see that the time of stormy and “precise” formalizations for the argument seems to be in the past (by the mid-80s of the twentieth century, they practically disappear). At the same time, interest has not dried up, but has again moved into the realm of pure metaphysics: it seems that if we manage to give a good (read – successful) definition of the term “God” (or its analogue), the proof will finally become not only obviously correct, but also the most persuasive.

Notes:

[1.] We note right away that until now many philosophers (in particular, your humble servant) consider Kant’s criticism, if not decisive, then very significant in the issue of the impossibility of constructing a successful version of OA.

[2.] For example, E. Gilson comes to conclusions about Anselm’s argument that at present look more than naive, primarily because they are too far from modern methods of formal analysis of modal contexts. Thus, according to Gilson, Anselm’s argumentation “is based on the following principles: 1) the concept of God is given by faith; 2) existence in thinking already means true existence; 3) the existence in thinking of the concept of God logically requires the assertion that he exists in reality. Here they also proceed from <...> a fact of a special order — the fact of faith” [Gilson 2004, 186].

[3.] The analysis of Hartshorne’s reasoning steps belongs to the author of the article and can serve as a topic for discussion.

Bibliography

1. Friedman 1979 – Friedman J.L. The Mystic’s Ontological Argument // American Philosophical Quarterly. 1979 Vol. 16. No. 1. P. 73–78.

2. Friedman 1980 – Friedman J.L. Necessity and the Ontological Argument // Erkenntnis. 1980 Vol. 15. No. 3. P. 301–331.

3. Hartshorne 1961 – Hartshorne Ch. The Logic of Ontological Argument // The Journal of Philosophy. 1961 Vol. 58. No. 17. P. 471–473.

4. Kane 1984 – Kane R. The Modal Ontological Argument // Mind. new series. 1984 Vol. 93. No. 371. P. 336–350.

5. Makin 1988 — Makin S. The Ontological Argument // Philosophy. 1988 Vol. 63. No. 243. P. 83–91.

6. Malcolm 1960 – Malcolm N. Anselm’s Ontological Argument // The Philosophical Review. 1960 Vol. 69. No. 1. P. 41–62.

7. Matthews & Baker 2010 — Matthews G.B., Baker L.R. The Ontological Argument Simplified // Analysis. 2010 Vol. 70. No. 2. P. 210–212.

8. McGrarth 1988 – McGrarth P.J. The Ontological Argument Revisited // Philosophy. 1988 Vol. 63. No. 246. P. 529–533.

9. Oppy 1991 – Oppy G. Makin on the Ontological Agrument // Philosophy. 1991 Vol. 66. No. 255. P. 106–114.

10. Oppy 1995 – Oppy G. Ontological Arguments and Belief in God. Cambridge University Press, 1995.

11. Plantinga 1974 – Plantinga A. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford, 1974.

12. Anselm 1995 – Anselm of Canterbury. Works. M.: Kanon, 1995.

13. Gorbatova 2012 — Gorbatova Yu.V. Plantinga and its modal version of the ontological proof // History of Philosophy. 2012. No. 17. P. 243–261.

14. Gorbatova 2015 – Gorbatova Yu.V. Stephen Makin’s Ontological Argument: A Concept That Ensures the Necessary Existence of God // Kant’s Collection. 2015. No. 1 (51). pp. 43–54.

15. Dragalina-Chernaya 2007 — Dragalina-Chernaya E.G. “A word to the heedful” or a dialogue with the “madman”? Logic and rhetoric of “Proslogion” // Models of reasoning – 1: Logic and argumentation. Kaliningrad: Publishing House of the Russian University. I. Kant, 2007. C. 170–180.

16. Dragalina-Chernaya 2009 – Dragalina-Chernaya E.G. Litigation about “one hundred thalers”. Via Eminitae // Kant’s collection. 2009. No. 2 (30). pp. 89–100.

17. Dragalina-Chernaya 2011 — Dragalina-Chernaya E.G. Deductions of existence. Traveling through possible and impossible worlds // Possible worlds. Semantics, ontology, metaphysics. Moscow: Kanon+, 2011, pp. 40–66.

18. Davis 2016 — Davis S.T. God, Reason, and Theistic Evidence. M .: Science – Eastern Literature, 2016.

19. Gilson 2004 — Gilson E. Philosophy in the Middle Ages: From the origins of patristics to the end of the 14th century. M.: Respublika, 2004.

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Named the most suitable age for learning a foreign language

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• Photo by Global Look Press.

At what age should one start learning a foreign language in order to reach the level of a native speaker? Spoiler alert: “The sooner the better” doesn’t work.

For many years experts have been discussing the existence of the so-called critical period in the development of the child, during which he manages to better learn foreign languages. Many researchers agreed that it is better to start training as early as possible. A new study has shown that children are able to master a new language, the level of which would correspond to a native speaker, for a longer time than thought.

In general, many data show that it is more difficult for adults to learn foreign languages ​​than for children. As a result, scientists have suggested that there is a critical period for language learning. Meanwhile, the duration of the period and the reasons underlying it remain largely a mystery.

To collect a large amount of data, a team of scientists from Boston College, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University developed a test that was later launched on Facebook (banned in Russia).

It recorded participants’ grammatical skills and collected other information related to learning a foreign language. As a result, the test became incredibly popular, and scientists collected data from 669,498 people.

“Until now, it has been difficult to obtain all the data needed to answer the question of how long the critical period lasts,” says Josh Tenenbaum of MIT, one of the authors of the study.

After studying huge amounts of data using various computational models, it became clear that until about 17 or 18 years old a person is in the best shape to learn a foreign language, which is almost 10 years longer than previously thought.

“We were very surprised by the results,” says one of the project’s researchers, Joshua Hartshorne of Boston College.

Of course, a person who learns a new language in adolescence and later can reach a fairly high level, and the test showed this. But, as the study revealed, reaching the level of native speaker proficiency is possible only if a person has already begun to learn the language by the age of 10.

“If you want to be proficient in English grammar like a native speaker, then you should start at around age 10. We don’t see much difference between people who start learning at birth and people who start learning at age 10,” Hartshorne says. , specifying that they noticed a decrease in quality in those who began to study the language later.

At this stage, it is not clear what happens at the age of 17 or 18, resulting in a deterioration in a person’s ability to learn a new language. Perhaps it’s all about the plasticity of the brain, scientists say, and perhaps other factors.

“Probably there is a biological change. Maybe there are social or cultural factors behind it,” says Tenenbaum. As a rule, after the age of 17 or 18, people leave their parental home, start working or studying at a specialized university. All this can affect the speed of learning for any language, “adds the scientist.

According to Mahesh Srinivasan of the University of California at Berkeley, it has long been observed that learning a second language is easier early in life, and the new work provides the most compelling evidence that there is a certain time after which the ability to learn the grammar of the new language is reduced.

“This is an important step forward for this area. After the study, new questions also arise, since it turned out that the critical period ends much later than previously thought,” says Srinivasan. He did not participate in the study.

Meanwhile, it cannot be said that adults are not capable of learning a language and that the whole learning process is useless for them.